Civil Disabilities in an Era of Diminishing Privacy: A Disability Approach for the Use of Criminal Records in Hiring by Elmore, Andrew
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 64 
Issue 4 Summer 2015 Article 3 
Civil Disabilities in an Era of Diminishing Privacy: A Disability 
Approach for the Use of Criminal Records in Hiring 
Andrew Elmore 
aelmore@law.miami.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Elmore, Civil Disabilities in an Era of Diminishing Privacy: A Disability Approach for the Use of 
Criminal Records in Hiring, 64 DePaul L. Rev. (2015) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol64/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CIVIL DISABILITIES IN AN ERA OF DIMINISHING
PRIVACY: A DISABILITY APPROACH FOR THE
USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS IN HIRING
Andrew Elmore*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
II. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING AND ITS
APPLICATION TO CIVIL DISABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
III. THE MASS PROLIFERATION OF CRIMINAL RECORDS,
AND ITS IMPACT ON PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
A. The Mass Proliferation of Criminal Background
Histories and Their Use in Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
B. Exclusion of People with Criminal Records from the
Labor Market, Particularly African-Americans . . . . . . 1005
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE REGULATION OF CIVIL
DISABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008
A. The Regulation of Civil Disabilities in
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008
1. Privacy Restrictions on Irrelevant Civil
Disabilities for Employment Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . 1009
2. Procedural Protections: Regulation of Prehire
Inquiries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
3. Nexus Protections Requiring a Relationship
Between Civil Disability and the Position
Sought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
B. Privacy Protections Are Few and Easily Bypassed by
Employer Inquiries by Outside Credit Reporting
Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013
* Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law.  This Article draws from
the author’s previous work leading hiring discrimination investigations in the New York Attor-
ney General’s Civil Rights Bureau. The views expressed in this Article are the author’s alone
and do not reflect the views of the Bureau or the office. The author is grateful to Susan Plum and
the Skadden Foundation for their unflagging support, to Maurice Emsellem, Noah Zatz, and
Sharon Deitrich for helpful conversations and comments on prior drafts, and to Joe Falk and the
other editors of the DePaul Law Review for their invaluable assistance.  The author dedicates
this Article to the memory of N. Lee Elmore, a tireless advocate on behalf of young people in
need of a second chance.
991
992 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:991
C. Procedural Protections Alone May Not Deter
Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014
D. Courts Are Reluctant To Apply Nexus Standards To
Strike Down Employer Justifications for the Use of
Civil Disabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016
1. Courts Require Heightened Statistical Showing
To Find Disparate Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016
2. Courts Defer to Employers in Interpreting Nexus
Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
V. A DISABILITY APPROACH TO REGULATE THE USE OF
CIVIL DISABILITIES IN EMPLOYMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
A. Applying the Disability Framework to Civil
Disability Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030
B. Privacy Standards To Prevent Disclosure of
Irrelevant Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
C. Procedural Protections Consistent with the ADA . . . . 1032
D. Nexus Protections Focused on Postconviction
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033
VI. CRITIQUES OF THE USE OF THE DISABILITY MODEL
FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
A. The “Perverse Consequences” Critique: Disability
Protections Will Result in More Discrimination
Against African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
B. The Legal Avoidance Critique: Employers Will
Respond to Procedural and Nexus Protections by
Evading Them, and Shielding Civil Disabilities from
Disclosure is Futile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
INTRODUCTION
Long after a criminal act has occurred, the disposition entered, and
the penalty imposed, the criminal record remains.  It is a stigma to
overcome anytime a person with a criminal conviction needs a job,1 a
loan, or an apartment.2  A criminal record often penalizes people with
criminal records far beyond the sentence envisioned by a judge, result-
1. Employers have a strong aversion to hiring applicants with criminal records.  “Surveys find
that 60 to 70 percent of employers would not knowingly hire [a person with a criminal convic-
tion.]” DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS IN-
CARCERATION 34 (2007).
2. Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice: Prisoner Reentry as an Opportunity To
Confront and Counteract Racism, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 259, 275–76 (2009); see
also Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
963, 972–78 (2013).
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ing in severe postincarceration deterioration of health, chronic unem-
ployment, and disruption of family and community networks.3  It is a
civil disability, a state-imposed stigma that can serve as a lawful basis
to discriminate.  It often never disappears.
The United States has the largest prison population in the world.
Nearly seven million individuals are under the supervision of adult
correctional systems; there are over two million people in prison and
jail in the United States, or approximately 1 in every 100 American
adults.4  In the U.S., there are 70 million people with criminal
records.5  The daunting challenge facing policymakers contemplating
how to reintegrate released prisoners into society6 has been intensi-
fied by the mass proliferation of criminal records7 and their wide
availability to anyone with an Internet connection.8
People with a criminal conviction suffer from poor employment
outcomes and are far more likely to live in poverty than comparable
individuals who were never incarcerated.9  African-American commu-
nities, already laboring against high poverty rates, shoulder the great-
est burden from the collateral consequences of incarceration.  Nearly
one in three adult black males without a high school degree is incar-
cerated,10 and one-fifth of African-Americans live in poverty because
of a previous incarceration.11
Steady, meaningful employment is a key strategy to decelerate the
revolving door that keeps prisoners incarcerated.  One-and-a-half mil-
3. John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1050–53 (2009).
4. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243936, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 tbl.1 (2013),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4843 (reporting correctional popula-
tion data from 2000 to 2012).
5. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HIS-
TORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2012, at 13 tbl.25 (2014), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf-
files1/bjs/grants/244563.pdf.
6. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC
MOBILITY 8–9 (2010) [hereinafter COLLATERAL COSTS].
7. “In 2006, nearly 81 million criminal records were on file in the states, 74 million of which
were in automated databases.  Another 14 million arrests are recorded every year.”  Alfred
Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal Background
Checks, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., June 2009, at 10, 10.
8. Brad Stone, If You Run a Red Light, Will Everyone Know?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at 4
(describing a Web site that provides criminal record information without cost).
9. After a criminal conviction, persons have a higher incidence of joblessness and are often
shunted into secondary, informal, and less secure labor markets, such that people  “with prison
records are estimated to earn 30 to 40 percent less each year” than people of the same gender,
race, age, and educational background. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN
AMERICA 120–25 (2006).
10. COLLATERAL COSTS, supra note 6, at 8.
11. WESTERN, supra note 9, at 127.
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lion Americans are released annually from state and federal prisons.12
While nearly half of these released prisoners are rearrested within a
year,13 prisoners with steady employment have fewer interactions with
the criminal justice system.14  In the words of Devah Pager, “When
[people with criminal records] are employed, they have less reason to
engage in crime; they impose fewer burdens on the families and com-
munities that support them; and if they desist from crime, they impose
fewer costs on the taxpayers who would otherwise fund their
reincarceration.”15
The large and increasing flow of people with criminal records out of
incarceration, the pervasive joblessness of people with criminal
records, and its economic consequence for their families, particularly
in African-American communities, and the societal benefit of lower-
ing recidivism, require a reexamination of policies intended to assist
people with criminal records to successfully reintegrate into main-
stream society.  With the burgeoning postincarceration population,
there has been an increase in legislative and scholarly interest in poli-
cies that increase societal welfare by successfully reintegrating re-
leased prisoners into society, or “reentry.”16  In 2012, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued new guidance
setting forth clear standards and best practices by which employers
should conduct valid risk assessments before rejecting applicants be-
cause of a criminal record history,17 and has brought a series of cases
12. E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 243920, PRISONERS IN 2012, TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at
1 fig.1 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf.
13. PAGER, supra note 1, at 127.
14. David F. Weiman, Barriers to Prisoners’ Reentry into the Labor Market and the Social
Costs of Recidivism, 74 SOC. RES. 575, 577 (2007); see also Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disad-
vantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 195 (2009); Karen E. Needels, Go Directly to Jail and
Do Not Collect? A Long-Term Study of Recidivism, Employment, and Earnings Patterns Among
Prison Releasees, 33 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 472 (1996).  While a person with quality
employment can also engage in criminal behavior if the opportunity arises, quality employment
removes interest in and opportunity for criminal conduct over time. See Christopher Uggen &
Melissa Thompson, The Socioeconomic Determinants of Ill-Gotten Gains: Within-Person
Changes in Drug Use and Illegal Earnings, 109 AM. J. SOC. 146, 147–50 (2003).
15. PAGER, supra note 1, at 26.
16. One commentator describes reentry as a realignment of the traditional rehabilitation goal
of criminal justice, “not as a way to improve the individual offender for his or her own sake, but
rather as a way to improve public safety for all of society.”  Jessica S. Henry, The Second Chance
Act of 2007, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 416, 419 (2009).
17. EEOC, NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EM-
PLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012) [hereinafter
EEOC ARREST AND CONVICTION GUIDANCE].
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against employers with restrictive background check policies.18  Pro-
pelled by a nationwide “Ban the Box” movement,19 over 100 states
and municipalities regulate employer inquires about an applicant’s
criminal record history to limit the types of criminal record histories
that can be used for employment purposes and to prohibit certain
types of conviction-based disqualifications.20
Reentry scholarship offers valuable critical analyses of the various
approaches to regulate the use of criminal convictions in hiring, but
typically do not stray from criticism of Title VII disparate impact juris-
prudence and Ban the Box laws.21  In recommending new approaches,
commentators have primarily sought to address employer concerns
that background check restrictions will court negligent hiring claims.22
But, despite the fact that Ban the Box statutes take a partial step to-
ward the procedural protections of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), reentry scholarship has only recently considered the ap-
plicability of disability protections to people with civil disabilities, in-
cluding criminal convictions.23
18. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 785–86 (D. Md. 2013); Complaint at 1–2,
EEOC v. DolGenCorp LLC, No. 1:13-cv-04307 (N.D. Ill. filed June 11, 2013), 2013 WL 3010490;
Complaint at 1, EEOC v. BMW Mfg. Co., No. 7:13-cv-01583 (D.S.C. filed June 6, 2013), 2013
WL 3010489.
19. The “Ban the Box campaign” began in 2004 with the “goal of removing conviction-based
discrimination from hiring decisions by preventing the initial inquiry on employment applica-
tions.”  Aaron F. Nadich, Comment, Ban the Box: An Employer’s Medicine Masked as a Head-
ache, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 767, 771–72 (2014); see also Jonathan J. Smith, Banning
the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on
Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 211–12 (2014) (“As one [Ban
the Box] advocate has explained: ‘We’re not asking anyone to hire ex-felons.  It’s about giving
them the opportunity to interview with the employer, sell themselves and tell their own story.’”).
20. See generally NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND
STATES ADOPT FAIR HIRING POLICIES TO REDUCE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS (2015) [hereinafter NELP BAN THE BOX REPORT].
21. See, e.g., Nadich, supra note 19, at 770, 807 (supporting Rhode Island’s Ban the Box law);
Smith, supra note 19, at 216, 218 (criticizing Ban the Box laws and supporting EEOC Arrest and
Conviction Guidance).
22. See, e.g., J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., From Arrest to Reintegration, A Model for Mitigating
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2009, at 42, 51 (2009); Ryan
D. Watstein, Note, Out of Jail and Out of Luck:  The Effect of Negligent Hiring Liability and the
Criminal Record Revolution on an Ex-Offender’s Employment Prospects, 61 FLA. L. REV. 581,
582 (2009); Kristen A. Williams, Comment, Employing Ex-Offenders: Shifting the Evaluation of
Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 UCLA L. REV. 521,
523–26 (2007).
23. Kimani Paul-Emile independently proposes a “Health Law Framework,” which would ap-
ply ADA protections by prohibiting prehire criminal record inquiries by employers and requir-
ing reasonable accommodations of criminal record histories.  Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title
VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information
Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 936–40 (2014).  This Article agrees that these protections would re-
present an important improvement over the status quo, but also finds that their effectiveness
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An evaluation of normative and legal frameworks to encourage the
employment of people with criminal convictions is in order.  While
current approaches are likely to eliminate overbroad initial hiring
screens, there remains the unfinished project of reintegrating persons
with criminal convictions into the workforce.  For this, policy tools are
needed to discourage the misuse of irrelevant criminal convictions and
to encourage a contextualized evaluation of criminal convictions and
the fair consideration of applicants’ qualifications separate from them.
This Article proposes a disability normative and legal framework as
a useful approach to guide this analysis.  Disability laws first consider
the privacy interests implicated in medical inquiries.  If a medical in-
quiry has little relevance in employment and is likely to be misused or
misinterpreted, it may be shielded on privacy grounds.  If medical in-
quiries are potentially relevant, then the procedural and substantive
protections codified in the ADA serve the mutually supportive goals
of debiasing employers predisposed to reject qualified applicants and
encouraging contextualized evaluations of them.  Applied to criminal
records, ADA protections would guide a contextualized evaluation of
an applicant’s qualifications for the job, and of the workplace risk
presented by a criminal conviction.  As with some medical informa-
tion, however, procedural and nexus protections alone may be insuffi-
cient to dissuade employers from denying applicants based on minor,
distant convictions that do not present a workplace risk.  This is par-
ticularly true given the lack of objective information about the predic-
tive force of a past conviction.  A disability approach would prohibit
the use of irrelevant criminal convictions by sealing or expunging
them.  This approach is consistent with disability norms and would
counteract the pervasive assumption that any criminal background is
always an unreasonable risk to persons or property, particularly when
the applicant is African-American.
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I briefly summarizes the
key features of a disability normative and legal framework that apply
to hiring screens, taking personality tests and genetic screens as exam-
ples. It also introduces the analogy of criminal records as a civil disa-
bility in need of disability privacy and equal opportunity protections.
Part II describes the growth of criminal record history as a dominant
negative credential in hiring, and the impact of overbroad criminal
record hiring screens in reducing employment opportunities for peo-
ple with criminal records, particularly those who are African-Ameri-
depends on the other privacy and nexus protections discussed in this Article to reduce considera-
tion of irrelevant records and promote the fair consideration of relevant ones.
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can.  Part III discusses the ways in which federal, state, and local
governments have responded to the increasing use of civil disabilities
as negative markers in employment applications.  It then evaluates
these regimes, finding that Title VII disparate impact challenges often
face insurmountable litigation hurdles, and that many state protec-
tions apply a vague “reasonableness” standard to apply criminal re-
cord screens.  It also finds that procedural protections in some
jurisdictions do not go far enough in ensuring an individualized assess-
ment of candidates, that there are few privacy protections, and that
those protections that do exist are often easily evaded.  Part IV pro-
poses a disability framework that would restrict employer access to
long-ago and minor convictions that do not predict future behavior by
sealing or expunging these records, while permitting employers to re-
view the criminal records of conditional employees that may predict
future behavior, and to reject those conditional employees who pre-
sent a genuine risk that cannot be accommodated.  Part V addresses
potential criticisms of this approach—namely, that limiting criminal
record inquiries will perversely increase discrimination against Afri-
can-Americans and that privacy protections will not succeed in re-
stricting employer access to civil disabilities.
This Article concludes that a disability approach will facilitate the
large-scale reintegration of people with minor or long-ago criminal
convictions in the workplace, but may not improve employment out-
comes for recently incarcerated people or people with repeat convic-
tions who present a real workplace risk.  The success of this approach
for these candidates whose criminal history may indicate a genuine
workplace risk will depend on further research into the relevance of
criminal record histories in making valid assessments in employment.
A greater understanding of the workplace risk that a criminal convic-
tion presents will assist employers in fairly evaluating applicants with
a criminal conviction and in making reasonable accommodations for
them.  It would also guide criminal justice agencies seeking to allocate
incentives for employers who hire applicants whose criminal convic-
tions signal the greatest workplace risk, and determining which crimi-
nal convictions are irrelevant and should be sealed or expunged.
II. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING AND ITS APPLICATION
TO CIVIL DISABILITIES
Disability laws and norms, which balance the privacy and anti-dis-
crimination interests of people with physical and mental disabilities
against legitimate employer interests in inquiring about them, is di-
rectly applicable to the employment discrimination experienced by
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people with civil disabilities. Like physical and mental disabilities,
which are “a product of social ordering”24 independent from the med-
ical impairment of a disability, civil disabilities, such as criminal con-
victions and poor credit histories, are not fixed or inevitable markers
of inferiority.  As described in the next Part, the relevance and use of
criminal records in employment has grown over time with their mass
proliferation.  Just as physical and mental disabilities are “informed by
anxieties and fears about the fragility of health and the stigma of dif-
ference,”25 criminal records trigger fears about the applicant that are
often grounded in the stigma of the record rather than its risk.
People with disabilities, medical and civil alike, share a dual interest
in privacy and equal opportunity.26  Unlike other forms of discrimina-
tion, in which intentional discrimination is almost always unlawful,27
but like physical and mental disabilities, a civil disability may be a
legitimate ground to exclude an applicant if the civil disability
presents an unreasonable risk to the workplace.  As with a disability
framework, protections for persons with criminal convictions and
other civil disabilities do not primarily seek to force employers to dis-
regard them, but rather to consider them in their full context and to
reintegrate people with civil disabilities into society despite them.
Disability legal protections are grounded in the constitutional right
to privacy,28 which is heightened when the information at issue is
highly stigmatizing, of little relevance, or likely to be misinterpreted.29
24. John F. Muller, Disability, Ambivalence, and the Law, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 469, 470 (2011).
25. Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and Re-
sistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 96 (2008) (discussing the social
model of disabilities).
26. Scott P. Kramer, Note, Why Is the Company Asking About My Fear of Spiders? A New
Look at Evaluating Whether an Employer-Provided Personality Test Constitutes a Medical Exam-
ination Under the ADA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1279, 1290 (“The main purpose of the ADA’s
stance on medical examinations is to ensure that a ‘hidden disability remains hidden.’”); see also
Maureen E. Mulvihill, Note, Karraker v. Rent-A-Center: Testing the Limits of the ADA, Person-
ality Tests, and Employer Preemployment Screening, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 865, 906 (2006) (“Con-
gress enacted the ADA to prevent employers from discovering [psychiatric] disabilities and then
making adverse employment decisions based on stereotypes and generalizations associated with
a mental disability.”).
27. There is rarely a “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) that would permit dispa-
rate treatment on the basis of race.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012).  The EEOC interprets the
BFOQ exception narrowly, see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) (2014), as does the Supreme Court, see
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) (“The BFOQ defense is written
narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly.”).
28. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that
there is “no question that an employee’s medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a
personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protections”).
29. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that genetic testing by an employer without consent violates the constitutional right to
privacy).
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Where medical inquiries are potentially relevant, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) “reinstitutionalize[s] the concept of employ-
ment qualification”30 by separating an employer’s evaluation of an ap-
plicant’s qualifications to perform necessary job duties from the
consideration of whether an applicant’s disability might require rea-
sonable environmental adaptations.  The ADA accomplishes this by
imposing a procedural requirement that prohibits medical inquiries
until after the employer decides whether the applicant is suitable for
the job, and a nexus one, requiring that an adverse determination
based on a disability is sufficiently related to the applicant’s inability
to perform the job.31  Generally, an employer cannot engage in a pre-
employment inquiry about “whether the job applicant has a disability
or the severity of a disability,”32 but may inquire about whether an
applicant is able to perform job-related functions.33  For example, the
employer is entitled to ask how the applicant can perform the neces-
sary job-related duties with or without an accommodation.34  Other-
wise, it is a per se violation of the ADA to make pre-employment
medical inquiries.35  In contrast, once an employer makes a condi-
tional offer, the ADA permits the employer to make post-hire medical
inquiries.  This includes requiring a medical examination as a condi-
30. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 476, 481 (2000).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A), (B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a), (c).
32. Susie v. Apple Tree Preschool & Child Care Ctr., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 390, 397 (N.D. Iowa
1994); see also Barnes v. Cochran, 944 F. Supp. 897, 904 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (finding that “the ADA
prohibits pre-offer ‘medical examinations,’” intended to discover the existence, nature, or sever-
ity of an individual’s physical or mental impairment).  Questions and medical examinations fo-
cused on discovering the existence, nature, or severity of medical impairments violate the ADA.
See Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Correctional Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2003) (reason-
ing that “we believe that since general diagnoses may expose individuals with disabilities to
employer stereotypes, the Policy [requiring a medical certification following an absence] impli-
cates the concerns expressed in these provisions of the ADA”); see also Roe v. Cheyenne Moun-
tain Conference Resort, 920 F. Supp. 1153, 1154–55 (D. Colo. 1996) (prohibiting employers from
requiring employees to disclose the prescription drugs that they take as a prohibited disability-
related inquiry).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (“A covered entity may make pre-employment inquiries into the
ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions, and/or may ask an applicant to describe
or to demonstrate how, with or without reasonable accommodation, the applicant will be able to
perform job-related functions.”).
34. Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 675 (1st Cir. 1995) (“The ADA does not
require an employer to wear blinders to a known disability at the pre-offer stage . . . .”).  This
exception also may compel disclosure of disabilities that would present a physical danger to the
applicant or other employees.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 981 (S.D.
Tex. 1996) (“Physical defects such as eyesight, hearing, limb impairment, diabetes, back or heart
trouble, high blood pressure, fits, convulsions, fainting, etc., in light of the requirements of the
bus driver position, are relevant job-related inquiries and are consistent with business
necessity.”).
35. Conroy, 333 F.3d at 95–96.
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tion of hire, provided that such inquiries are applied to all conditional
hires for the job classification.36  Similar to the Title VII disparate im-
pact test, however, the ADA only permits employers to reject condi-
tional employees because of physical and mental disabilities based on
criteria that are job related and consistent with business necessity.37
Legislatures and the judiciary have considered two types of hiring
screens, personality tests and genetic screening, which demonstrate
the dual goals of privacy and contextualization in a disability frame-
work.  By the mid-twentieth century, employers widely adopted per-
sonality tests to screen out applicants with negative workplace
characteristics.38  Commentators reviewing the predictive value of
personality tests came to question their validity, particularly as a pre-
dictor of job performance.39  Of specific concern was that employers
would use a personality test out of context: by the 1960s, Guion and
Gottier cautioned that “the validity of any personality measure must
be specifically and competently determined for the specific situation
in which it is to be used and for the specific purpose or criterion within
that situation.”40
After the ADA was enacted in 1990, the EEOC and courts grap-
pled with the question of whether psychological personality tests are
“medical inquiries” that cannot be administered until the applicant
has been offered the position.41  In Karraker v. Rent-A-Car,42 the Sev-
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A).  However, the results of the medical inquiries must be kept
confidential and available for government ADA compliance reviews on request. Id.
§ 12112(d)(3)(B)–(C).
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
[I]f certain criteria are used to screen out an employee or employees with disabilities as
a result of such an examination or inquiry, the exclusionary criteria must be job-related
and consistent with business necessity, and performance of the essential job functions
cannot be accomplished with reasonable accommodation as required in this part.
Id.
38. Mulvihill, supra note 26, at 873–74; see also Matthew W. Finkin, From Anonymity to
Transparence: Screening the Workforce in the Information Age, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403,
416 (stating that by the 1980s, 11% to 17% of employers used personality tests).
39. Wesley A. Scroggins et al., Psychological Testing in Personnel Selection, Part I: A Century
of Psychological Testing, 37 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 99, 105 (2008).  One study reviewed the
academic literature about personality testing and found that the correlation between personality
and job success is “close to zero.”  Frederick P. Morgeson et al., Are We Getting Fooled Again?
Coming to Terms with Limitations in the Use of Personality Tests for Personnel Selection, 60
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1029, 1033 (2007).  Other commentators found that personality tests re-
sulted in an unacceptably high percentage of false negatives because people with high cognitive
abilities were able to recognize the “correct” answers.  Richard L. Griffith et al., Do Applicants
Fake? An Examination of the Frequency of Applicant Faking Behavior, 36 PERSONNEL REV. 341,
345 (2007).
40. Robert M. Guion & Richard F. Gottier, Validity of Personality Measures in Personnel
Selection, 18 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 135, 159–60 (1965).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
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enth Circuit held that a personality test that could be used to diagnose
mental illnesses was a medical inquiry under the ADA because “no
matter how the test is used or scored—that is, whether or not [the
employer] used the test to weed out applicants with certain disorders,
its use of the [personality test] likely had the effect of excluding em-
ployees with disorders from promotion.”43  After Karraker, “employ-
ers can no longer use or adapt clinical psychological personality tests
to determine employment suitability—a far-reaching impact in today’s
world where employment screening has become so extensive.”44
More recently, employer genetic screens came under scrutiny re-
garding whether they should be contextualized under the ADA or
prohibited on privacy grounds.  With the advent of low-cost genetic
screening, employers increasingly required their use in hiring.45  Com-
mentators questioned the relevance of using genetic screens in hiring
because they only indicate a potential predisposition to a disability,46
and are thus likely to be misread or misused, and raised concerns that
patients would decline genetic tests for fear of employment discrimi-
nation.47  For example, in 2001, the EEOC filed an ADA suit against
an employer for forcing employees to undergo genetic testing to de-
termine whether they had a genetic susceptibility to Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome to lower its potential ADA and workers’-compensation lia-
bility.48  Increasing concerns about the stigma of genetic predisposi-
tions to medical conditions, and about the accuracy of such tests, led
Congress to pass the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in
2008, banning genetic screens in hiring.49
Together, these cases illustrate the disability framework approach to
hiring screens.  As with genetic screening, if the test is highly stigma-
tizing and likely to be misused, the information is shielded from use
on privacy grounds.  If the screen is potentially relevant and can be
evaluated in context, like the personality test in Karraker, it is appro-
priately regulated under the ADA.  This framework is directly appli-
cable to civil disabilities.  As described in Part III.B.2, applicants have
a heightened interest in shielding employer access to irrelevant crimi-
42. 411 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2005).
43. Id. at 836–37.
44. Mulvihill, supra note 26, at 908.
45. Abigail Lauren Perdue, Justifying GINA, 78 TENN L. REV. 1051, 1066–71, 1078–82 (2011).
46. Id. at 1065–68, 1082.
47. Id. at 1076; see also Joanne Barken, Note, Judging GINA: Does the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 Offer Adequate Protection?, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 545, 554 (2009).
48. Perdue, supra note 45, at 1077.
49. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff, 2000ff-1 to -12
(2012).
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nal records, and, as with personality tests, records showing a possible
workplace risk can only be fairly evaluated if separated from the ap-
plicant’s qualifications for the position and grounded in a contextual-
ized analysis.
III. THE MASS PROLIFERATION OF CRIMINAL RECORDS, AND ITS
IMPACT ON PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
The accessibility of private, prejudicial information has had
profound consequences for the job prospects of people with civil disa-
bilities.  Over 90% of employers offering clerical, sales, and service
positions, nearly double the rate of twenty years ago, request criminal
background information from the applicant.50  As Devah Pager writes,
a criminal record is a type of “negative credential,” the archetype of
“official markers that restrict access and opportunity rather than ena-
bling them.”51  For entry-level positions requiring few hard skills or
educational pedigrees, screens for negative credentials provide firms
with a low-cost means to evaluate candidates without expending the
resources necessary for reviewing an individual’s background and
qualifications through interviews, skills-based tests, or reference
checks.  Instantaneously and at low cost, a company may use a crimi-
nal background screen to eliminate applicants with a violence-related
felony because “someone with a conviction for a violent crime is more
likely than someone without one to commit a future violent crime;”52
or with a larceny conviction to “control[ ] theft.”53  Or employers may
screen out employees with credit histories that reveal “financial stress
or burdens that might compromise their ethical obligations.”54  Crimi-
nal record histories are the dominant, though by no means exclusive,
criteria for negative credential screens.
This Part first describes the proliferation of criminal record histo-
ries, then concludes that the mass proliferation of criminal records has
greatly diminished the employment prospects of people with criminal
records, particularly African-Americans with criminal convictions,
who trigger in employers a powerful association between race and
criminality.
50. Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Background Checking: Conducting Criminal Background
Checks, at slide 3 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.slideshare.net/shrm/background-check-
criminal?from=share_mail; see also Smith, supra note 19, at 198 (stating that half of employers
used criminal conviction history to screen applicants in 1996, reaching 80% by 2003).
51. PAGER, supra note 1, at 32.
52. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 245 (3d Cir. 2007).
53. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 738–39 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
54. EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Edu. Corp., No. 10-cv-02882, slip op. at 1–3 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 28, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A. Mass Proliferation of Criminal Background Histories
and Their Use in Employment
Criminal records have long been available through courts and pri-
vate credit reporting agencies, and background checks have been a
standard practice for certain employment, such as police officers.  But
the ease with which employers may access criminal records is a new
phenomenon.55  Before the advent of information technology, back-
ground checks were necessarily limited in scope, requiring a “case-by-
case basis [inquiry] directly from whatever state or local agency main-
tained such records.”56  Criminal record repositories were carefully
shielded by privacy laws, which restricted the noncriminal use of crim-
inal records to particular occupations involving direct contact with
vulnerable populations or requiring the carrying of weapons.57
The mass proliferation of criminal records follows the increasing
digital flow of information, making public what was previously private
or difficult to obtain.  In the 1980s, national criminal databases con-
verted from paper-and-ink fingerprints to digital ones, facilitating the
electronic confirmation of federal, state, and municipal criminal
records.58  National and local criminal justice agencies increasingly
permitted private companies to purchase criminal record histories,
making them available for inexpensive resale to private employers
seeking to conduct a comprehensive background check for hiring.59
Now, the federal government and all states have constructed digital
databases of criminal histories, which they sell or provide for free to
the public.60  Information vendors, also called credit reporting agen-
cies, purchase this criminal record data from the various jurisdictions
and consolidate the data into vast repositories that they repackage for
sale to employers.61  Consumer reporting agencies with a large econ-
55. See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Crimi-
nal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 186–87 (2008).  Federal funding and techni-
cal support for a national repository of state and federal criminal records in the 1990s has led to
a comprehensive system of criminal records.  All states have created comprehensive databases of
criminal records, which they sell to employers and commercial information vendors. See gener-
ally id. at 179–87.
56. Logan Danielle Wayne, Comment, The Data-Broker Threat: Proposing Federal Legisla-
tion to Protect Post-Expungement Privacy, 102 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 253, 262 (2012); see
also Paul-Emile, supra note 23, at 902.
57. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY
BACKGROUND CHECKS 19–20 (2006) [hereinafter DOJ CRIMINAL HISTORY REPORT].
58. Id. at 14.
59. Id. at 38–40.  For example, the FBI processed 9.8 million civil fingerprint-based back-
ground checks in 2005, up from 6.8 million checks in 2001, a nearly 50% increase. Id. at 21.
60. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 55, at 179–85.
61. Id. at 186–87; see also DOJ CRIMINAL HISTORY REPORT, supra note 57, at 37.
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omy of scale with sizable computing abilities can process large batches
of background checks quickly and at low marginal cost.62  One credit
reporting agency “claims to have in excess of . . . ninety million crimi-
nal records. . . . [and to have conducted] approximately 3.3 million
background investigations in 2002, the overwhelming majority of
which included a criminal records search.”63  Alongside the formal
credit reporting agencies, “a new industry has mushroomed to provide
low-cost information, often through the internet.”64  These firms have
made checking criminal record histories fast, easy, and virtually free
to anyone with access to the Internet.
In response to the increasing availability of criminal record history
repositories, employer use of criminal record history “has increased
sharply over the past decade.”65  Almost all employers make some
inquiry about criminal history, at the front end of the application
through a direct inquiry to the applicant in the application, or later
through a background check.66  Many large firms require applicants to
submit applications electronically, which often requires applicants to
divulge their criminal record history and to consent to a background
check.  Criminal backgrounds, once disclosed in an electronic applica-
tion or background report, are often then evaluated before the appli-
cant has had direct contact with the employer.67  Credit reporting
agencies can automatically determine whether the candidate is accept-
able to the client employer by using a “matrix” or “adjudication
guideline,” provided by that client employer, which lists the types of
convictions that merit automatic rejection or further evaluation.68  In
this manner, employers may use negative credentials, such as criminal
background histories, to prescreen large batches of applications each
day, effectively filtering many or most of them from further considera-
tion at low cost, instantaneously, and without any human interac-
tion.69  As a result, from single-family household employers70 to
62. See generally Robert M. Hunt, A Century of Consumer Credit Reporting in America (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila. Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 05-13, 2005).
63. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 55, at 186.
64. Weiman, supra note 14, at 584.
65. Id.
66. See PAGER, supra note 1, at 112–14.
67. James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 387, 388–90 (2006).
68. See Adjudication: You Be the Judge, HIRERIGHT (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.hireright
.com/blog/2009/11/adjudication-you-be-the-judge/ (“Adjudication adds consistency to the back-
ground screening process and can increase efficiency across your organization, removing the
guesswork and subjective individual ‘judgment calls’ from your company’s hiring guidelines.”).
69. A 2009 investigation by the New York Attorney General found at least one national re-
tailer that used an electronic application to categorically reject any applicant who disclosed a
prior conviction, raising “the disturbing possibility that the practices they engaged in may be
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national, publicly traded firms, electronic applications have become a
standard means to screen individuals based on self-disclosed positive
and negative markers before assessing candidates individually.
B. Exclusion of People with Criminal Records from the Labor
Market, Particularly African-Americans
The mass proliferation of criminal records “poses a serious chal-
lenge to reformers seeking to smooth the reentry of people with crimi-
nal records in the community.”71  Many employers state that they
would not hire a person with a criminal conviction,72 and one study
found that “a criminal record reduces the likelihood of a callback or
job offer by nearly 50 percent.”73  Studies have shown that mere con-
tact with the criminal justice system, even an arrest that did not lead
to a conviction, carries a stigma that leads to poor employment out-
comes for the applicant.74  Employer audits indicate that employers
confronted with an applicant with a criminal record history often re-
ject the applicant on an immediate, instinctive aversion to people with
criminal records.75
The categorical exclusion of people with criminal convictions from
the labor market has vast societal implications.  Incarceration is asso-
ciated with a lifetime of sporadic employment in “secondary labor
more widespread than supposed.” See Editorial, Denied a Chance for Honest Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2010, at A30.  Later EEOC suits suggest that such practices are indeed common. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 789 (D. Md. 2013) (describing a typical employer
screen that inquires about criminal record histories in the application and then conducts a back-
ground check, eliminating from consideration applicants whose responses or checks reveal cer-
tain types of criminal convictions); Complaint at ¶¶ 17–23, EEOC v. BMW Mfg. Co., No. 7:13-
cv-01583-HMH-JDA (D.S.C. filed June 11, 2014), 2013 WL 3010489 (alleging automatic rejec-
tion of candidates after background check revealed certain convictions, without individual as-
sessment); Complaint at ¶¶ 7–14, EEOC v. DolGenCorp, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-04307, 2014 WL
3734361 (D. Ill. July 29, 2014) (alleging use of background check and a matrix that automatically
disqualifies applicants with certain convictions within a certain period of time).
70. For example, Care.com, an Internet hiring service for household employers, provides
prescreening services for prospective employers, including criminal background checks. See
CARE.COM, http://www.care.com/background-checks-p1402.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
71. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 55, at 178.
72. Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What
They Do, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 355, 366 fig.2 (2005).
73. Pager et al., supra note 14, at 199.  In fact, employers are far less likely to hire a person
with a criminal conviction than they are willing to admit. See generally Pager & Quillian, supra
note 72.  In one audit of employers who were first asked their willingness to hire a person with a
criminal conviction and then presented with an applicant who disclosed a criminal record his-
tory, “[e]mployers generally express a greater likelihood of hiring applicants with criminal
records, and a far greater likelihood in the case of black applicants, than we see in actuality.” Id.
at 370.
74. PAGER, supra note 1, at 49–50, 176 n.16.
75. Pager et al., supra note 14, at 203.
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markets with little job security, little opportunity for advancement,
and miniscule earnings.”76  As Jacobs and Crepet explain, the prolifer-
ation of criminal records entrenches people with criminal records in
their subordinated status, itself a driver of recidivism:  “Persons stig-
matized with a criminal label face de jure and de facto discrimination
in employment, housing, and access to government social welfare ben-
efits.  Restricted socioeconomic opportunities make re-offending
more likely.  Ironically then, the consequence of the more expansive
criminal records system may be more crime.”77
These impacts serve no legitimate criminal justice goals.  The pro-
foundly disruptive effects of a criminal conviction are not taken into
account by judges imposing sentences or policymakers who recom-
mend penalties, and are not proportionate to the offenses commit-
ted.78  The lack of restrictions on employer inquiries does nothing to
reduce recidivism or deter future unlawful conduct, and undermines
the criminal justice goals of imposing penalties that have a low societal
“cost” and that are proportional to the offense committed.79  On the
contrary, studies have shown that policies that promote employment
reduce recidivism, promoting both deterrence and rehabilitation.
While all people with criminal records face strong headwinds in ob-
taining a postincarceration job, the mark of a criminal record is often
an insurmountable burden for African-Americans.  Race pervades an
employer’s decision about the suitability of applicants.  Blacks with
similar qualifications as whites are less likely to be found suitable for a
job by employers.80  At the same time, “race remains stitched into
76. Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1051.
77. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 55, at 178–79 (footnote omitted).
78. Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1049 (“[A]ny amount of incarceration creates a signifi-
cantly higher likelihood that ex-inmates will suffer a variety of health-related, economic, and
social harms with substantial negative hedonic consequences that will make adaptation ex-
tremely difficult.”).
79. Id. at 1065–66.
80. For example, a 2004 study of employer callback response rates of resumes with identical
work experiences that were racially coded with “black” and “white” names found that those
containing non-African-American-sounding names received more favorable treatment.  Mari-
anne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 1011
& 1012 tbl.A1 (2004); see also MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED,
OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 2, 11 (1991) (stating that in
approximately 20% of 476 hiring audits, the white applicant was able to advance farther through
the hiring process than an equally qualified black counterpart); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit
Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST.
RES. 143, 153 tbl.1 (2004) (reviewing literature that shows employer-biased behavior in employ-
ment). But see Ronald G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Dis-
tinctively Black Names, 119 Q.J. ECON. 767, 771 (2004) (questioning Bertrand and
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each and every phase of the criminal justice system,”81 African-Amer-
icans comprise only 12% of the general population but 40% of the
prison population, and one in three black men can expect to spend
some time in prison.82  There is thus a strong double bind for African-
Americans, who are most likely to experience actual contact with the
criminal justice system, and who labor against the racial stereotype
that associates black men with criminality.83
Field studies have shown that a criminal record profoundly distorts
job opportunities, with race often playing a determinative role in
whether an employer is willing to give people with criminal records a
second chance.  In a landmark study, Devah Pager measured the ef-
fect of criminal records on employment through an in-person,
matched-pair audit that tested the proportion of applications that
matched testers received callbacks or were called back by an em-
ployer for a job.84  Unsurprisingly, the results showed that people with
criminal records were called back by employers half as often as candi-
dates who reported a “clean” background.85  Moreover, matched pairs
of applicants of different races reporting the same criminal conviction
yielded far worse outcomes for African-Americans: employers offered
call-backs to 17% of whites with criminal records but only 5% of Afri-
can-Americans with criminal records.86  As Pager notes, criminal
records cannot be disentangled from race because employers often
perceive the relevance of a criminal record through the lens of the
race of the applicant who reports it.87 The disparate impact of criminal
record employment inquiries on race discrimination as shown in the
Pager study adds to the urgency of efforts to regulate the use of crimi-
nal background checks, even as the study’s finding of persistent race
discrimination in hiring adds to the complexity of the problem, as will
be discussed in Part VI.A.
Mullainathan’s study design for failure to control for other forms of statistical discrimination, as
“blacker” names are also associated with lower socioeconomic status and education levels).
81. Pinard, supra note 2, at 969.
82. PAGER, supra note 1, at 3.
83. See, e.g., Lyles-Chockley, supra note 2, at 268–71.
84. Pager’s study identically matched applicants (who were trained testers) seeking job oppor-
tunities who differed only in one key respect.  In one testing group, one applicant posed as a
person with a criminal conviction while the other had no conviction. PAGER, supra note 1, at
59–61.  In another, the tester was white and the other black, and each had a conviction. Id.  In
still another, the testers again were white and black, but one posed as having a conviction while
the other had no conviction. Id.
85. Controlling for race, employers called people with criminal records back 17% of the time
while nonoffenders received a 34% callback rate. Id. at 67.
86. Id. at 90–91 fig.5.1.
87. Id. at 90–92 (stating that employers called back 34% of white applicants with no criminal
record but just 14% of black applicants with no criminal record).
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IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE REGULATION OF CIVIL DISABILITIES
This Part discusses and analyzes the effectiveness of the three types
of regulations in place to limit the disclosure of and shape the evalua-
tion of criminal background histories and other types of negative cre-
dentials for employment purposes: (1) privacy protections, which
shield records from use; (2) procedural protections, which postpone
the use of records in employment; and (3) nexus protections, which
require employers to base a denial of employment on some relation-
ship between the record and the position sought.  While these protec-
tions significantly overlap,88 this typology is nevertheless a useful
starting point for evaluating civil disability protections because they
generally describe different policy tools and legal regimes.
This Part finds that (1) the few privacy protections that apply to
civil disabilities are easily bypassed by employer self-help; (2) proce-
dural protections often fail to adequately separate applicant-suitability
determinations and disability evaluations by permitting evaluations of
a criminal conviction before the employer provides a conditional of-
fer; and (3) nexus protections are undermined by courts that often
impose a heightened Title VII disparate impact standard and by the
vagueness of most state nexus protections.  It concludes that current
protections fail to adequately encourage employers to individually as-
sess an applicant’s qualifications and of the real workplace risk indi-
cated by a criminal conviction.
A. The Regulation of Civil Disabilities in Employment
Federal, state, and local governments regulate the disclosure and
evaluation of criminal records for employment purposes on antidis-
crimination and privacy grounds.  Privacy restrictions, enforced by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Federal Trade Commis-
sion and state equivalents,89 protect privacy interests by limiting the
types of negative credentials that can be accessed from public
databases for employment purposes.  Privacy restrictions include du-
rational limitations, or the time period in which a negative credential
is available, and dispositional restrictions, or limits on the types of
available negative credentials.  A growing number of state and munic-
ipal Ban the Box jurisdictions provide for procedural protections that
limit the use of a negative credential until after the application stage,
88. For example, individuals with a criminal record often must prove their rehabilitation
before receiving a privacy protection, and rehabilitation is also a key factor in nexus protections.
Procedural and nexus protections seek the same policy goal of requiring contextualized assess-
ments of criminal records.
89. See generally DOJ CRIMINAL HISTORY REPORT, supra note 57, at 42–46.
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for example after an employer provides a conditional offer to an ap-
plicant.  Antidiscrimination laws, enforced by the EEOC and state
equivalents, impose nexus restrictions, that is, they require that em-
ployers show a particular nexus between a negative credential and the
position sought.  Because antidiscrimination and privacy protections
overlap, this Article discusses their nexus, procedural, durational, and
dispositional protections together.
1. Privacy Restrictions on Irrelevant Civil Disabilities for
Employment Purposes
Privacy protections limit the types of negative credentials that are
appropriate for disclosure or evaluation for employment purposes.
Unlike the ADA, consumer protection and antidiscrimination laws
impose privacy protections that prohibit access to and use of certain
civil disabilities.90  Privacy protections categorically prohibit the avail-
ability and use of certain information because it is never relevant, or
because its low relevancy is outweighed by its potential for misuse.
Most jurisdictions that regulate the use of civil disabilities in em-
ployment exclude information based on their age and type of informa-
tion under the Fair Credit Reporting Act91 (FCRA) and analogous
state law.  State consumer-protection laws prohibit the release of in-
formation related to bankruptcies, tax liens, and past judgments after
a certain number of years.92  The FCRA and most states permit dis-
closure of any criminal history, except for arrests that did not lead to a
conviction, or where a charge was sealed or dismissed.  Four states
prohibit disclosure of criminal records after a period of time, between
five and ten years, depending on the state and the severity of the
crime.93  Some states also limit disclosure of convictions that have
been expunged or sealed,94 such as those of juvenile offenders or
criminal offenses less severe than misdemeanors.95  Some states also
provide for sealing or expungement of most convictions after a period
90. The ADA generally has no relevancy requirement for pre-employee medical inquiries.
See, e.g., EEOC ARREST AND CONVICTION GUIDANCE, supra note 17.
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012).
92. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380–j(f)(1)(i) (McKinney 2012).
93. Id. § 380–j(f)(1)(v), (f)(2)(iii) (prohibiting disclosure after seven years); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 378-2.5(b)–(d) (LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting disclosure after ten years); MASS GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 276, §§ 100A–C (West 2014) (permitting employers to view felonies within the
past ten years, and misdemeanors within the past five years); WASH REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.96A.020, 9.96A.060, 9.96A.30 (LexisNexis 2014) (prohibiting disclosure after ten years).
94. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51i, 46a-80 (2009 & Supp. 2014); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16)
(McKinney 2012); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380–j(a)(1); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.335(1)(a) (West
2014).
95. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16).
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of time on successful application to the sentencing court, which has
the effect of prohibiting credit reporting agencies (CRAs) from re-
porting them.96  Unlike other states, in which expungement is discre-
tionary, Massachusetts must seal the dispositions after a period of time
at the request of the person with a criminal conviction, and on certifi-
cation that the person has not been convicted of crimes in other states
during that period.97
In addition to prohibiting certain information, privacy protections
require the reporting of rehabilitative information in the criminal re-
port.  New York State provides for certificates of relief from disabili-
ties,98 which “create a ‘presumption of rehabilitation’ that must be
given effect by employers and licensing boards, and that is judicially
enforceable.”99  Other states presume rehabilitation with the passage
of time, but only for occupational licensing purposes, not
employment.100
2. Procedural Protections: Regulation of Prehire Inquiries
Some jurisdictions use procedural requirements to discourage the
summary use of negative credentials without assessing the individual
applicant’s ability to perform the work.  Similar to the ADA model of
regulating the manner in which employers make prehire disability in-
quiries, over 100 cities and counties and eighteen states prohibit some
employers from inquiring about criminal record history in an initial
application.101  Of these, twelve cities and counties and seven states
prohibit private employers from inquiring about criminal record his-
tory in an initial application.102  Hawaii, New Mexico, and some cities,
including New York City, prohibit criminal record inquiries until after
an applicant has been provided a conditional offer of employment,103
while others permit criminal history inquiries after the initial employ-
96. MARGARET LOVE & APRIL FRAZIER, A.B.A., CERTIFICATES OF REHABILITATION AND
OTHER FORMS OF RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION: A SURVEY
OF STATE LAWS 9–11 (2006).
97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 100A (West 2014).
98. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 701 (West 2014).
99. Id. § 753(2).
100. LOVE & FRAZIER, supra note 96, at 7–8.
101. NELP BAN THE BOX REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
102. The states with private-employer procedural restrictions are Hawaii, Illinois, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode Island; the cities are Baltimore, Buffalo, Chi-
cago, Columbia, Montgomery County, Newark, New York City, Prince George’s County,
Philadelphia, Rochester, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. See id at 13–14, 66–70.
103. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5(b)–(c) (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3
(West 2011).
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ment application,104 after the application’s selection for an inter-
view,105 or after the applicant is selected as a finalist.106  At some
point after the initial interview, the employer is then permitted to
evaluate whether a conditional employee’s criminal background his-
tory should result in rejection or withdrawal of the offer of
employment.
3. Nexus Protections Requiring a Relationship Between Civil
Disability and the Position Sought
Most jurisdictions protect applicants from discrimination through
nexus requirements: requiring that a criminal conviction bear some
relationship to the position sought.  All jurisdictions protect against
race, national origin, and gender-based discrimination, and prohibit
negative credential screens that have a disparate impact on a pro-
tected class unless the employer can show that the screen is job re-
lated and consistent with business necessity.107
The EEOC presumes that rejecting applicants because of a past
conviction has a disparate impact on African-Americans and Latinos,
and thus violates Title VII unless the employer can establish a busi-
ness necessity defense.108  In its 2012 guidance on the use of criminal
record history in employment, the EEOC clarified the nexus protec-
tion for determining whether an employer’s rejection is job related
and consistent with business necessity.  It requires that employers use
either a criminal conduct screen validated like other screens, or an
individualized assessment that considers, at minimum, the factors pre-
viously discussed by the Eighth Circuit in Green v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co.: (1) “the nature of the crime;” (2) “the time elapsed;”
and (3) “the nature of the job . . . and then provides an opportunity
for an individualized assessment for people excluded by the screen to
determine whether the policy is related and consistent with business
necessity.”109
104. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch, 151B, § 4(9.5) (West 2014); BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE ch. 154,
art. V, § 154-25 (2015).
105. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.021 (West Supp. 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.  § 28-5-7 (West
Supp. 2014).
106. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3; see also Smith, supra note 19, at 214–15 (cataloguing types of
procedural protections by jurisdiction).
107. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see also El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
479 F.3d 232, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2007); Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir.
1975).
108. See EEOC ARREST AND CONVICTION GUIDANCE, supra note 17.  The EEOC Guidance
also describes ways in which employers may rely on criminal record history to engage in dispa-
rate treatment of Black and Latino applicants, in violation of Title VII. Id. at 6–9.
109. Id. at 14 (citing Green, 523 F.2d at 1297).
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Some state and municipal jurisdictions additionally consider people
with criminal records to be a protected class and prohibit disparate
treatment of people with criminal records.  The precise nexus require-
ments differ widely among the states: that the conviction have a “rea-
sonable relationship,”110 “relate,”111 “substantially relate,”112 or
“directly relate”113 to or “reasonably”114 or “rational[ly]”115 bear on
the position sought or the applicant’s trustworthiness.116  Some states
in addition to those factors considered in Green and by the EEOC
require consideration of applicant rehabilitation;117 the state’s public
policy in favor of employment of people with criminal records; the age
of the person at the time of the offense; and the nature and severity of
the conviction.118
The next Section evaluates these protections, concluding that they
fail to sufficiently encourage a contextualized assessment of applicants
with a criminal conviction.
110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904(E) (West 2010).
111. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9125 (West 2012).
112. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.335(1)(b) (West 2012).
113. KY. REV. STAT. § 335B.020 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West Supp. 2014).
114. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710(f) (2007).
115. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5(a) (LexisNexis 2010).
116. Some jurisdictions find a direct relationship between certain offenses and positions with-
out further need to consider factors, such as previous sex- and drug-related offenses, schools, and
child-care facilities.  Other jurisdictions exempt nexus requirements entirely for certain posi-
tions, particularly law enforcement and armed security guards.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-904(E) (West 2010) (exempting law enforcement agencies); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-2-3 to -
6 (West 2011) (permitting rejection of applicants with previous drug offenses from certain posi-
tions in schools and child care centers); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15) (McKinney 2010) (exempting
peace officers and police); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.96A.020, 9.96A.030, 9.96A.060 (Lexis-
Nexis 2014).
117. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80 (West Supp. 2014) (relationship between offense
and job, rehabilitation, and time elapsed since the conviction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West
Supp. 2015); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(g) (McKinney 2014).  Some of these states provide a
certificate of rehabilitation or good conduct for applicants who have demonstrated their rehabili-
tation.  See Williams, supra note 22, at 547 & n.178.  For example, in New York State, a Certifi-
cate of Relief from Disabilities creates a rebuttable presumption that the individual with the
criminal conviction is rehabilitated and the conviction should not result in a denial of employ-
ment or licensure. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(2).
118. Id. § 753(1)(a)–(h).  Commentators have praised the requirement to consider a number
of factors related to a criminal conviction prior to using it as a basis for disqualification of an
applicant.  Jennifer Leavitt, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public Interests in the
Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1294–98 (2002) (praising how New
York “amplifies and clarifies” the protections of people with criminal records in anti-discrimina-
tion law through required deliberative factors); see also Leroy D. Clark, A Civil Rights Task:
Removing Barriers to Employment of Ex-Convicts, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 193, 208–09 (2004) (ap-
proving of New York’s “contextual evaluations”).
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B. Privacy Protections Are Few and Easily Bypassed by Employer
Inquiries by Outside Credit Reporting Agencies
National privacy protections are quite weak, applying only to very
old debts and nonpending arrest records.  Strikingly, the FCRA and
most states impose few limits on the disclosure by credit reporting
agencies (CRAs) of criminal convictions, aside from requiring their
accuracy.  Equally important, the FCRA and most state privacy pro-
tections only apply to CRAs, which employers can easily bypass by
inquiring about criminal record history directly from the applicant or
some public source.119  While some states prohibit employer inquiries
about older or petty marijuana-related criminal convictions, most do
not.120  Direct inquiries of applicants in most instances cannot be
evaded: in most states, an applicant can be rejected for refusing to
disclose convictions, and in all states, for misstating a criminal back-
ground history.  Thus, even if privacy protections extended to all irrel-
evant and prejudicial data regarding civil disabilities held by CRAs,
these could be easily accessed by employers elsewhere.
Although CRAs are required to report rehabilitative information
such as certificates of disability, there are few rehabilitative disposi-
tions for CRAs to report.  Five states provide an automatic statutory
“presumption of rehabilitation” to people with criminal convictions
after a period of time, but this relief only applies to licenses, not em-
ployment.121  New York State, the only state in which a certificate of
relief from disabilities creates a presumption of rehabilitation in pri-
vate employment, grants only about 3,000 of them per year.122  Along
with the fewer than 1,000 administrative pardons annually granted in
the six states that provide them, state-granted rehabilitation findings
assist an astonishingly small number of the 70 million people with
criminal records.  While the FCRA requires CRAs to update records
to ensure their accuracy,123 it is unclear the extent to which CRA up-
dates reflect rehabilitative findings, which may deprive employers of
important context in considering a criminal record.
119. Meredith J. Fried, Note, Helping Employers Help Themselves: Resolving the Conflict Be-
tween the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Title VII, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 220 (2000); see also
Paul-Emile, supra note 23, at 918.
120. Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Washington prohibit inquiries into certain criminal convic-
tions based on the age of the conviction. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5(b)–(d) (LexisNexis
2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4.9 (West 2013); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-12-140
(2015).  California and Ohio prohibit inquiries into certain marijuana-related offenses. CAL.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 432.8 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.04 (LexisNexis 2010).
121. LOVE & FRAZIER, supra note 96, at 7–8.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Fried, supra note 119, at 224–25.
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C. Procedural Protections Alone May Not Deter Discrimination
Like the ADA, Ban the Box restrictions on prehire inquiries play a
key role in preventing the categorical exclusion of applicants with civil
disabilities.  First, for employers seeking to screen out applicants with
civil disabilities, requiring self-disclosure in the initial application is a
costless and efficient manner to categorically reject them.  Overbroad
screens that hide categorical rejections behind a faceless application
system leave the applicant with little notice that the rejection was the
result of criminal record history, and with no opportunity to explain
their suitability for the job.  All Ban the Box laws address this prob-
lem by prohibiting criminal record inquiries until after the initial
application.
Second, Ban the Box laws that require the employer to assess candi-
dates’ qualifications before inquiring about criminal records en-
courage employers to separate the stigma of a conviction from its risk
to the workplace.  Thorough, individualized assessment of a disability
is impractical at the application stage, particularly by firms that rely
on electronic, large-scale batch hiring.  Individualized assessments are
more likely when only applied to the smaller pool of candidates who
the employer would otherwise hire.  Isolating civil disabilities from
other factors that may disqualify an individual, and after the applicant
has already been found qualified for the position, encourages employ-
ers to contextualize the negative credential.  As Pager, Western, and
Sugie explain, for people with criminal records who trigger strong
aversions by employers, “limits on interaction reduce opportunities to
contextualize a conviction or to demonstrate evidence of successful
rehabilitation.”124  This may be because “the interaction itself can
work to clarify and shape the employers’ interpretation of the criminal
record.”125  Procedural protections may deter overbroad screens by
inviting more thorough and individualized evaluations.
Only New Mexico and Hawaii, however, require employers to pro-
vide a conditional offer to applicants before inquiring about a criminal
124. Pager et al., supra note 14, at 201.
125. Id. at 204; see also Nadich, supra note 19, at 774 (Ban the Box laws “give[ ] the applicant
the potential to explain the circumstances surrounding the conviction, express sincerity in his or
her rehabilitation, and fuse a connection with the employer.”).  Joseph Fishkin provides a similar
rationale for such restrictions:
The rough conception of merit operative at the initial application stage is never as
nuanced as the one in the final evaluation; at the first cut, a simple “no convictions”
rubric may well be the micro-efficient choice. . . . Ban the box requires employers to
pay for a more meritocratic hiring strategy than some might otherwise choose . . . .
Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck in Employment Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV.
1429, 1469–70 (2014).
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record history and conducting a background check.126  To take two
recent examples, Rhode Island’s and New Jersey’s Ban the Box laws
prohibit employers from inquiring about criminal history in the initial
application, but permit such inquiries anytime afterward, and do not
impose any nexus restrictions.127  To some supporters of Ban the Box
campaigns, this has the advantage of lessening the burden of a crimi-
nal conviction without infringing on an employer’s prerogative to de-
velop its own substantive hiring policies.128  But by failing to require
employers to make a suitability determination first, these laws may
not narrow the applicant pool sufficiently to encourage an individual-
ized risk assessment.  Some employers may apply the same overbroad
screen at a later stage.  Even when employers make a bona fide at-
tempt to assess the candidate in an interview, employers may conflate
risk with suitability, finding that anyone without a civil disability is
better suited to a position than a person with one.129  Sole reliance on
procedural protections may also encourage the use of background
checks,130 which is unlikely to improve the employment prospects of
people with criminal records unless the checks themselves are guided
by appropriate nexus standards.131  For these reasons, while deterring
overbroad initial hiring screens, some Ban the Box procedural protec-
tions may, standing alone, not result in substantially greater employ-
ment opportunities for people with criminal records.132
126. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5(b)–(c) (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3
(West 2011).
127. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2003); Nadich, supra note 19, at 768; John McDonald & Joel S.
Barras, N.J. Latest State To Limit Employers’ Ability To Ask if Job Applicant Has Criminal
Record, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2014/
08/12/new-jersey-becomes-latest-to-ban-the-box-prohibiting-employers-from-inquiring-about-
applicants-criminal-record-during-initial-application-process/.
128. For a supportive view of this balance, see Nadich, supra note 19, at 796–807.
129. Smith, supra note 19, at 216 (faulting Ban the Box laws in which “employers retain sub-
stantial discretion in determining the weight they attach to an applicant’s criminal record”).
130. Nadich, supra note 19, at 806 (“[B]y drawing attention to the criminal conviction inquiry,
the Ban the Box movement may reduce the chance that employers will forego conducting a
background check.”).
131. Studies have shown that increased use of background checks results in greater exclusion
of people with criminal records.  Michael A. Stoll & Shawn D. Bushway, The Effect of Criminal
Background Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders 29 (Inst. for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper
No. 1326-07, 2007).
132. Of course, legislative compromise requires trade-offs, and even a weak procedural pro-
tection is a significant improvement over nothing.  Instead, this Article argues that New Mex-
ico’s and Hawaii’s procedural protections serve important goals not met by Rhode Island’s and
New Jersey’s, and it is not clear that applicants with civil disabilities are best served by preferenc-
ing procedural protections over nexus ones. See Nadich, supra note 19, at 793–94 (stating that
the law Rhode Island passed was different than the bill which had stronger procedural protec-
tions and clear nexus standards).
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D. Courts Are Reluctant To Apply Nexus Standards To Strike
Down Employer Justifications for the Use
of Civil Disabilities
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to re-
move “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment,”133 which, in the years following Title VII’s enactment, came to
include negative credentials such as criminal records and credit history
with a disparate impact on a protected class.134  But commentators
have noted the general trend of courts limiting the reach of disparate
impact theory by narrowing permissible statistical evidence of discrim-
ination and by deferring to employer justifications of business neces-
sity.135  As a result, background check Title VII disparate impact cases
after the 1970s have largely failed. Claims under state and municipal
laws with vague nexus standards have met similar results, while claims
requiring consideration of relevant factors, such as the postconviction
history of people with criminal records, have fared better.
1. Courts Require Heightened Statistical Showing To Find Disparate
Impact
In order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
tion based on a disparate impact theory, the plaintiff must (1) identify
a specific employment practice that is being challenged; and (2) estab-
lish, through statistical means, that the identified employment practice
“caused the exclusion of applicants . . . because of their membership in
a protected group.”136  While courts considering early negative cre-
dential disparate impact claims accepted general evidence of national
133. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
134. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that
employer use of arrest information in hiring has an unlawful disparate impact on African-Ameri-
cans), aff’d, 472 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490,
496 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that it is unlawful discrimination under Title VII for an employer
to discharge employees who have had wages garnished because of its disparate impact on Afri-
can-Americans); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974) (same).
135. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
721 (2006).  For analysis of the limitations of disparate impact analysis in challenges to criminal
background checks, see Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination
Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 12–16
(2012). See also Sandra J. Mullings, Employment of Ex-Offenders: The Time Has Come for a
True Antidiscrimination Statute, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 261, 279–81 (2014) (stating that courts
dismissing disparate impact claims seem “to question the validity of using Title VII to attack the
use of criminal records information” and that Title VII is “inadequate to address the issues faced
by [people with criminal records] because it under-protects that group”); Smith, supra note 19, at
204–10; Nadich, supra note 19, at 791 (“Title VII has been, and will continue to be, an inade-
quate vehicle for protections of ex-offenders.”).
136. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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racial disparities, later courts have narrowed the criteria for accept-
able statistical evidence.137  Recently, courts rejected two EEOC Title
VII disparate impact challenges of criminal record and credit history
hiring screens for reasons that illustrate the difficulty of meeting
courts’ heightened standard for required statistical evidence.  In
EEOC v. Freeman,138 the employer screened out applicants with con-
viction histories that included types of violence-, drug-, or property-
related crimes, and applicants for certain positions based on overdue
debts, foreclosures, and bankruptcies;139 in EEOC v. Kaplan Higher
Learning Education Corp.,140 the agency sued Kaplan for its use of
credit checks for most of its employees.  The EEOC attacked both of
these checks, alleging that they had a disparate impact on African-
Americans.
The courts in Freeman and Kaplan granted summary judgment to
the employers for failure to show sufficient statistical evidence of a
disparate impact.  Both courts ignored the EEOC guidance that
presumes that such checks have a disparate impact based on race.  In-
stead, they closely examined the EEOC’s statistical evidence, expert
reports analyzing the employer’s internal applicant data, ultimately
precluding them because of errors.  Specifically, the Freeman court
criticized the experts’ sample, which “cherry-picked” data that tended
to show a disparate impact.141  Similarly, the Kaplan court excluded
an EEOC report that attempted to show a disparity in hiring based on
race because it drew from a nonrandom sample of applicants that the
EEOC could not show was representative of applicants as a whole.142
The Freeman court rejected the EEOC’s response that national sta-
tistics showing disparate conviction rates by race were sufficient to
show the disparate impact, because “[t]he general population pool
‘cannot be used as a surrogate for the class of qualified job applicants,
because it contains many persons who have not (and would not) be’
137. See, e.g., Litton Sys., 316 F. Supp. at 403 (accepting national arrest rates); Green v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293–95 (8th Cir. 1975) (accepting national conviction rates).
138. 961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013).
139. Id. at 788.
140. No. 1:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 322116 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013).
141. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 794–96.  Specifically, the expert supplemented the initial
applicant dataset with rejected applicants revealed during discovery, but did not include others
who were hired during that same period. Id.
142. Kaplan, 2013 WL 322116, at *5–7.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in Kaplan,
criticizing the EEOC for bringing “this case on the basis of a homemade methodology, crafted
by a witness with no particular expertise . . . to administer it, tested by no one, and accepted only
by the witness himself.”  EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749, 754 (6th Cir. 2014).
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applying for a job with [the employer].”143  Rejecting both firm-spe-
cific statistical evidence and national statistics of the general popula-
tion, the court held that the EEOC had failed to establish a prima
facie case.
After detailing these statistical failings, the Freeman court went on
to separately hold that the EEOC’s case could not survive because the
EEOC had failed to isolate a specific employment practice as required
under the particularly requirement of Title VII.  Under Title VII,
“[w]here a hiring process has multiple elements, the plaintiff must
identify the element(s) that it is challenging and ‘demonstrate that
each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate im-
pact,’ unless it can demonstrate that ‘the elements’ are not capable of
separation for purposes of analysis.”144  Rejecting the EEOC’s argu-
ment that the hiring process was not capable of separation, the court
characterized Freeman’s credit and background check policies as in-
volving “different types of checks depending on the specific job an
individual is seeking, consideration of both subjective and objective
criteria, and examination of a long list of factors, any one of which
might control the ultimate employment decision.”145  The court held
that the EEOC’s failure “to break down what is clearly a multi-fac-
eted, multi-step policy” was an additional ground to enter summary
judgment for the employer.146
The courts’ criticism of the EEOC’s expert reports in Freeman and
Kaplan is unlikely to have lasting impact; the Fourth Circuit narrowly
affirmed Freeman on the basis that the expert report was properly
excluded,147 and the agency will undoubtedly refine its statistical ap-
proach in future disparate impact cases.  Of greater import is the ex-
tent to which future courts limit acceptable statistical evidence in
disparate impact cases.  Federal courts have repeatedly rejected back-
ground check disparate impact claims because plaintiffs did not pre-
sent sufficient proof that available African-Americans were not
hired,148 and have refused to make inferences from available statis-
143. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 798 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S.
642, 653–54 (1989)).
144. Id. at 799 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B) (2012)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 800.
147. EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 468 (4th Cir. 2015) (“We affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to Freeman solely on the basis that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding EEOC’s expert reports as unreliable under Rule 702.” (footnote
omitted)).
148. Harwin, supra note 135, at 16 (discussing cases in which plaintiffs lost their disparate
impact challenges for failure to present statistics “indicating that fewer blacks were hired than
were qualified”); see also Paul-Emile, supra note 23, at 926–27 (noting the difficulty in Title VII
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tics.149  The holding in Freeman that the EEOC must separate out sta-
tistical disparities in each type of background check in order to
challenge any of them may encourage employers to combine checks
into a single hiring process to obscure the impact of any one of them.
It also emboldens critiques of statistical evidence that would doom
most disparate impact cases challenging the use of negative creden-
tials in hiring.  For example, critics of the EEOC’s targeting of over-
broad criminal conviction hiring screens argue that the EEOC should
not be able to “rely upon general incarceration statistics,”150 pointing
out that some regions have few racial minorities, and that racial dis-
parities in convictions vary depending on the type of offense.151  But
such a requirement is unnecessarily burdensome, requiring indepen-
dent statistical analyses of the racial disparities in thousands of dispo-
sitions across many jurisdictions.152  Requiring such “simultaneously
specific and comprehensive”153 data would also fail to capture appli-
cants who are dissuaded from applying because of a known employer
aversion to applicants with criminal histories or credit problems.  In
disparate impact cases of acquiring “the empirical data necessary to show how the employer has
treated similarly situated applicants”).
149. See, e.g., Freeman v. Atl. Ref. & Mktg. Corp., No. 92-7029, 1994 WL 156723, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 28, 1994) (dismissing a disparate impact claim for credit history discrimination, and
rejecting the plaintiff’s “common sense argument that the policy . . . disparately impacts blacks
because blacks are generally poorer than whites and thus they will have more bad credit reports
than whites”); Howard v. Cont’l Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., No. 82 C 792, 1983 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11923, at *5–7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1983) (granting summary judgment for an employer in a
Title VII claim that a bank’s refusal to rehire an African-American woman because of her poor
credit rating had a disparate impact because the pro se complainant failed to provide statistics
showing that that African-Americans and women are more likely to have worse credit scores
and “[t]he court refuses to infer this fact from statistics which show merely that members of
those groups are more likely to be poor”).
150. Terence G. Connor & Kevin J. White, The Consideration of Arrest and Conviction
Records in Employment Decisions: A Critique of the EEOC Guidance, 43 SETON HALL L. REV.
971, 998–99 (2013).
151. This argument could be extended to other areas, such as credit checks, requiring plain-
tiffs to identify disparities in every type of negative credit history in a particular background
check.
152. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp.
2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Mo. 2008), discussed in Connor & White, supra note 150, at 989–90.  The
court dismissed a disparate impact complaint for, inter alia, failure to produce evidence of statis-
tical disparities in convictions for sex offenses, as opposed to general conviction disparities. Id.
In that case the judge in chiding the pro se defendant for failing to produce adequate statistical
proof added, “one would suppose that sex offender registries would allow tracing of individuals
listed, with photographic or racial identifiers, thus allowing a statistical comparison.  There may
well be published studies on this subject.” Id. at 1030 n.3.
153. Harwin, supra note 135, at 16 (noting that in one disparate impact case, dismissed be-
cause the court refused to accept data because it compared available applicants against incum-
bents for an entire job class instead of a particular entry-level position, “[t]he court left
unaddressed the possibility that applicant flow data cannot not capture the full impact of policies
that discouraged individuals from applying in the first place”).
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the case of expansive background checks in jurisdictions with few ra-
cial minorities, statistics may result in such small sample sizes that sta-
tistical significance, the hallmark of a prima facie disparate impact
case, would vanish.
2. Courts Defer to Employers in Interpreting Nexus Standards
At the same time that courts apply rigorous skepticism to claims of
disparate impact, they have shown comparative deference to employ-
ers’ justifications for the use of the background checks.  While early
cases carefully scrutinized employer use of negative credentials in hir-
ing,154 now courts generally defer to the employer’s articulation of
business necessity under Title VII,155 with “radically relaxed standards
for business necessity and job-relatedness” for background check
suits.156
In El v. SEPTA,157 the most recent appellate court case to examine
the Title VII business necessity defense in background checks, the
Third Circuit rejected the argument that in order to establish a busi-
ness necessity defense, employers must consider the criminal back-
ground history of each individual candidate.  In SEPTA, the court
affirmed that an employer could use a bright-line rule in rejecting an
applicant for a paratransit driver position because of his criminal re-
cord history.158  The employer’s background check called for the re-
jection of any applicant with a conviction of certain criminal offenses
within seven years, or who are on probation or parole for any such
crime, no matter how long ago it occurred.159  SEPTA rejected El be-
cause he had been convicted of second-degree murder forty years ear-
lier, when he was fifteen years old.160
The Third Circuit held that employers may not use “common-
sense” assertions of business necessity but rather “must tailor their
154. See, e.g., Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974) (reversing the trial
court’s determination that an employer that terminated employees because their wages are gar-
nished met the business necessity defense standard through an affidavit that stated the com-
pany’s “experience” that the “capability, enthusiasm, efficiency, and quality of performance,” of
employees whose wages are garnished “noticeably decrease,” requiring employer to show, at
minimum, that “its garnishment policy fosters employee productivity and that there [are] no
acceptable alternative[s]”).
155. See Selmi, supra note 135, at 753.
156. Harwin, supra note 135, at 14.
157. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
158. Id. at 235–36.
159. Id. at 236.  The parties disputed whether this or a more expansive policy rejecting any
applicant with any conviction of a felony or misdemeanor applied, but the court of appeals up-
held the district court’s determination that the more narrow policy applied. Id.
160. Id. at 235–36.
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criteria to measure those qualities accurately and directly for each ap-
plicant.”161  But the court of appeals did not follow the Green factors,
and permitted use of “bright-line” criteria to exclude applicants with-
out requiring an individualized assessment.  It is enough that “a dis-
criminatory hiring policy accurately—but  not perfectly—ascertains an
applicant’s ability to perform successfully the job in question . . . .
[and] allows the employer to hire the applicant most likely to perform
the job [in question] successfully over others less likely to do so.”162
The court held that despite SEPTA’s “loose manner” in developing a
policy without considering the factors that indicate applicant risk and
the EEOC’s findings that the policy failed to consider the age of the
conviction and the applicant’s youth at the time of the offense, unre-
butted expert testimony that a violent criminal conviction predicts fu-
ture criminal activity “regardless of how much time passes” was
sufficient to establish business necessity.163
The suggestion in SEPTA that employers tailor criteria to measure
the predictive value of the negative credential is the closest that recent
federal appellate court decisions have come to the conclusion reached
by the EEOC in its enforcement guidance—that the Title VII business
necessity defense requires that employers either validate its back-
ground checks or perform an individualized assessment of candidates
that consider a variety of relevant factors.  Yet, despite its thorough
discussion, SEPTA permitted a matrix that would reject a candidate
based on a single forty-year-old negative credential without consider-
ing other factors.
Post-SEPTA case law considering the business necessity standard is
mixed.  In Waldon v. Cincinnati Public Schools,164 the court denied a
motion by the Cincinnati public school system to dismiss a Title VII
disparate impact claim by nine African-American employees termi-
nated because of a state law requiring termination of all public-school
employees previously convicted of specified crimes, no matter how
long ago.  The court declined to accept the employer’s business neces-
sity defense, ensuring the security of children in the schools, because
the policy operated to bar employment when their offenses were
remote in time, when [the plaintiff’s] offense was insubstantial, and
when both had demonstrated decades of good performance.  These
[p]laintiffs posed no obvious risk due to their past convictions, but
161. Id. at 240.
162. Id. at 242.
163. SEPTA, 479 F.3d at 247–48.
164. 941 F. Supp. 2d 884 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
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rather, were valuable and respected employees, who merited a sec-
ond chance.165
In contrast, another court found that a law firm demonstrated “ade-
quate business necessity” in its dismissal of an employee found to be
on a sex offender registry because of the potential for harm to co-
workers and to employee morale, as the firm was not required to
“overlook significant potential dangers, at least to employee mo-
rale.”166  Another court found that a retailer could have established a
business necessity defense in terminating an employee previously con-
victed for domestic violence, because the company distinguished “be-
tween applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk and those that
do not.”167
Courts construing general nexus state-law standards generally fol-
low the same pattern as SEPTA, deferring to employer justifications
for automatic disqualifications in background checks except in states
that require consideration of postconviction history.  For example, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in County of Milwaukee v. Labor & In-
dustry Review Commission,168 interpreting that state’s requirement
that a conviction “substantially relate”169 to the job, rejected “an in-
terpretation of this test which would require, in all cases, a detailed
inquiry into the facts of the offense and the job.”170  Instead, the court
held, it is enough for employers to consider the elements of the of-
fense and determine whether they relate to the job duties in
question.171
In contrast, in New York, where the state’s nexus standard requires
consideration of evidence of rehabilitation, courts have repeatedly
struck down background checks that fail to take into account evidence
of rehabilitation.172  To take one example, in El v. N.Y.C. Department
165. Id. at 889.
166. Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028,
1031 (W.D. Mo. 2008).
167. Ahmad v. Kmart, No. 08-CV-10454, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114937, at *5 n.1 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 2, 2008).
168. 407 N.W.2d 908 (Wis. 1987).
169. Id. at 909–10 (citing Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, WIS. STAT. §§ 111.31–111.37).
170. Id. at 916.
171. Id. at 917; see also Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, No.
00-1956, 2001 WL 641791, at *7–8 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding an administrative determina-
tion that conviction for “injury by conduct regardless of life” does not substantially relate to a
job in the school boiler room).
172. In New York, people with criminal records may obtain a “certificate of relief from disa-
bilities” which creates a “presumption of rehabilitation” that must be given effect by employers
and licensing boards, and that is judicially enforceable. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(2) (McKin-
ney 2014); see also Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 523 N.E.2d 806, 808 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that a
certificate of relief from disability confers a presumption of rehabilitation even when there is a
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of Education,173 an applicant for a substitute teacher position was re-
jected because a background check revealed a felony and several mis-
demeanors for burglary, trespass, and larceny, committed when he
was between eighteen and twenty years old.174  After his convictions,
he spent the following twenty years without an offense and became
accredited as a substance abuse counselor and teacher.  The agency
denied his application because of his felony conviction with no expla-
nation, and did not consider rehabilitative evidence, including a certif-
icate of relief from disabilities and a statement from him that after his
troubled teenage years in foster care he has had a lifelong goal of
“help[ing] and prevent[ing] children from becoming homeless and liv-
ing [a] self destructive life.”175  The court held that the agency deter-
mination violated that state’s nexus requirement, both for its failure to
consider his certificate of relief from disabilities, and because “no dis-
cussion is included of the particular facts of this case to demonstrate
how the various factors were evaluated and what weight each was
given.”176
Comparing the reasoning of El with that of SEPTA demonstrates
the role of New York’s specific nexus factors in guiding employers and
courts to consider the full context of a criminal record.  Both cases
involved sensitive positions, transporting disabled individuals and
teaching young children.  The plaintiff in SEPTA had a more serious
conviction, but unlike El, it was a single conviction, and it was a far
longer time ago, when the applicant was younger.  Yet the El court
found the rejection unlawful, while the SEPTA court held that the
plaintiff effectively faced a lifetime bar.  The dispositive factors in El,
lacking in SEPTA, are that New York requires employers to consider
postconviction history and provides people with criminal convictions
with a means to show their rehabilitation,177 while Title VII does not.
But New York State’s clear nexus requirements and certificate of
relief from disabilities do not satisfactorily resolve the question of why
federal courts so often defer to employer justifications for criminal
record screens in Title VII disparate impact claims.  Courts routinely
direct relationship between the offense and the job duties); Peluso v. Smith, 540 N.Y.S.2d 631,
635–36 (1989) (rejecting summary denial of a license to a construction inspector on same
ground).
173. No. 401571/08, 2009 WL 1271992 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
174. Id. at *3.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *5.
177. El’s certificate of rehabilitation may have been the decisive factor.  In an otherwise simi-
lar fact pattern, the New York Appellate Division upheld a rejection of an applicant for a posi-
tion driving a school bus because of drug-related convictions that were over a decade old.
Luther v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 969 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454 (App. Div. 2013).
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reject similar business necessity defenses raised in response to ADA
claims,178 and the EEOC enforcement guidance advises employers to
individually assess applicants with criminal convictions, evaluating
their postconviction history among other factors.
Grappling with this question requires an inquiry into the extent to
which disparate impact doctrinal requirements may both mask and
drive the judiciary’s underlying hostility to the class.  As the Wisconsin
Supreme Court commented, “[B]eing a criminal is a voluntary act—a
matter of choice.  There is no ‘right’ to be a criminal.  On the contrary,
one who engages in it is universally regarded as anti-social.”179  For a
class laboring against a judicially conferred badge of inferiority that
makes it difficult to garner sympathy from judges, a disparate impact
claim may be an inapt vehicle to draw a picture of stigmatized individ-
uals seeking a second chance, as relayed sympathetically in the El
case.  A court focusing on the statistical significance of racial dispari-
ties and seemingly reasonable employer policies is more likely to
blame the rejection on the individual’s own bad choices.180  So long as
disparate impact forces plaintiffs into a framework that does not tell
their stories, their negative credential—the serious conviction, the
foreclosure, the tax lien—is the only narrative that courts will see.
Second, the business necessity defense in a disparate impact chal-
lenge, and other nexus tests devised under state law, draw from a doc-
trine that historically requires validation of employment tests, such as
178. See, e.g., Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2003)
(stating that the ADA requires that a medical inquiry serves a “vital” business interest, that the
“inquiry genuinely serves the asserted business necessity and that the request is no broader or
more intrusive than necessary,” and that the inquiry is “a reasonably effective method of achiev-
ing the employer’s goal”); Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 515 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“[A]n examination that is ‘job related’ and ‘consistent with business necessity’ must, at mini-
mum, be limited to an evaluation of the employee’s condition only to the extent necessary under
the circumstances to establish the employee’s fitness for the work at issue.”); Cripe v. City of San
Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding the same).
179. Cnty. of Milwaukee v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 407 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Wis.
1987); see also Connor & White, supra note 150, at 1003 (“Criminal conduct is a product of
choice and is not an immutable characteristic of anyone’s race or ethnicity.  Therefore, it should
not be measured as if it were like an agility test or an educational qualification that can be
validated.”); Harwin, supra note 135, at 13 (“Judicial opinions expressed a particular distaste for
plaintiffs with criminal records.”); Tiffany R. Nichols, Comment, Where There’s Smoke, There’s
Fire?: The Cloud of Suspicion Surrounding Former Offenders and the EEOC’s New Enforcement
Guidance on Criminal Records Under Title VII, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 623 (2014) (“Individ-
uals with criminal records are the one group whom it is still permissible to hate.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
180. See, e.g., EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
The court in Carolina Freight, in rejecting an EEOC disparate impact claim that Latinos were
hired less often because of a company’s no-felony rule, reasoned that, “[i]f Hispanics do not wish
to be discriminated against because they have been convicted of theft then, [sic] they should stop
stealing.”  Id. at 753.
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physical or intellectual requirements, to ensure that the requirements
are required for job performance.181  As commentators have noted,
however, criminal background checks are an awkward fit for valida-
tion.182  Validation of a credential such as a physical or aptitude test
can be related directly to job performance by separating each respon-
sibility of a job and determining the skills required of each.183  In con-
trast, a negative credential such as a conviction history is only relevant
insofar as it is a reliable predictor of negative work behavior.184  This
requires a more indirect inquiry into the risk that a person with a
criminal conviction is likely to engage in bad conduct in the workplace
in the future.  Such an inquiry is necessarily contextual and often de-
fies intuitive reasoning, far more like a personality test governed by
the ADA than a strength test governed by Title VII.  Lacking a firm
ground to validate a hiring screen, a court may be more likely to ap-
prove of an employer’s common sense justification.
Any attempt to validate civil disability hiring screens would encoun-
ter little evidence that a criminal conviction, particularly a distant, mi-
nor conviction, indicates much about workplace performance or
behavior.  Generally, social scientists find that a criminal record his-
tory is more weakly associated with “counterproductive work behav-
iors”185 (CWBs) than other behavioral markers.  One study found a
high correlation between CWBs and adolescent conduct disorder and
high childhood cognitive abilities, but “little or no predictive validity
data on the relationship between past criminal behavior and counter-
productive behaviors at work.”186  For credit history, the research is
181. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977) (rejecting height and
weight criteria for hiring prison guards because they were not “shown to be necessary to safe and
efficient job performance”).
182. See Connor & White, supra note 150, at 991 (“It is, of course, not ‘essential’ to the job of
delivering furniture that an applicant not have a conviction for violent crimes, and if imposed,
the standard is not susceptible to the same scientific validity analysis as, for example, a pencil
and paper test.”).
183. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(A)
(2014); see also Connor & White, supra note 150, at 991.
184. Nichols, supra note 179, at 630 (“[R]igidly adhering to the Uniform Guidelines’ Ap-
proach—apt for addressing tests that produce raw scores and quantifiable data—is not fitting for
this novel form of discrimination attuned to risk rather than ability.”).
185. See, e.g., Brent W. Roberts et al., Predicting the Counterproductive Employee in a Child-
to-Adult Prospective Study, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1427 (2007) (defining counterproductive
work behaviors as “theft, white collar crime, absenteeism, tardiness, drug and alcohol abuse,
disciplinary problems, accidents, sabotage, sexual harassment, and violence”).
186. Id. at 1434.  In some instances, “people with an adolescent criminal conviction record
were less likely to get in a fight with their supervisor or to steal things from work.” Id. at 1430.
The authors offered several possible theories for this finding: that the experience of being caught
and punished for criminal activity meant that people with criminal records had “learned their
lesson”; that people with criminal records are more likely to fear losing their jobs; that a convic-
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even more definitive: no study has found that credit history has pre-
dictive value in workplace performance.187
In fact, recent studies about the recidivism rates of people with
criminal records have cast doubt on the entire project of using minor
or distant convictions to predict future bad behavior of any kind.
Prior to SEPTA, recidivism research focused on recently released
prisoners, with dismal findings: two-thirds of parole releases commit a
new offense or violate parole within three years of release.188  But the
SEPTA court’s clear ambivalence in holding that a past conviction
could bar an applicant from future work, no matter how long ago,
animated an effort among social scientists to study the predictive risk
that people with criminal records will re-offend compared with the
general population over time.  Comparing “redemption rates,” or the
rate at which the risk of reoffense, or hazard rates, among people with
criminal records approaches that of the general population, these
studies have shown that hazard rates decrease steadily over time.189
One cohort study of offenders and nonoffenders in a single metropoli-
tan area found that after seven years the hazard rates of offenders are
small, similar to that of comparable nonoffenders, which “supports ex-
plicit time limits in any statutory restrictions on employment.”190
Redemption studies have also revealed the importance of consider-
ing the age of the individual and the type of offense.  The most au-
thoritative of these studies, by Bushway, Nieuwbeerta, and Blokland,
examined the sensitivity of redemption rates to two factors, the age of
the person when the offense occurred, and whether the person is a
“reoffender,” or has more than one conviction.191  The Bushway study
tion is a poor indicator of illicit conduct because “most crimes go undetected”; and that individu-
als without a prior offense were superior at engaging in illicit conduct without being caught. Id.
at 1434.
187. On the contrary, one study found that “[t]here was virtually no relationship between
credit history and performance ratings.”  Laura Koppes Bryan & Jerry K. Palmer, Do Job Appli-
cant Credit Histories Predict Performance Appraisal Ratings or Termination Decisions?, 15 PSY-
CHOLOGIST-MANAGER J. 106, 123 (2012) (“While intuitively a credit history is measuring
responsibility and the ability to meet deadlines, in practice this measure is probably contami-
nated by many other factors outside an employee’s control, as well as inaccuracies.  Thus, our
data indicate there is no benefit from using credit history to predict employee performance or
turnover.”).
188. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 193427, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002).
189. See Paul-Emile, supra note 23, at 945–46 (finding that because hazard rates decrease over
time, “predictions regarding the risk of future crime based simply on a criminal record are likely
prone to error”).
190. Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters & Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record
Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 499 (2006).
191. Shawn D. Bushway et al., The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age
and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28–30 (2011).
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found that for one-time offenders, redemption rates shorten dramati-
cally as the age of the offender increases, from ten years after convic-
tion for the youngest groups of offenders, to two years for offenders
between forty-two and forty-six years old.192  In contrast, reoffenders
have substantially longer redemption rates, from ten years for the old-
est reoffenders to twenty-three years for younger offenders with four
or more offenses.193
These findings are supported by other studies that have previously
cautioned against drawing broad conclusions from an arrest or convic-
tion, particularly after the passage of time without a subsequent con-
viction.194  Additionally, Blumstein and Nakamura found that
redemption rates of individuals with previous first-time arrests vary
widely based on the nature of the crime.  For individuals in their twen-
ties, the redemption rate for individuals arrested for burglary is 3.8
years (4.3 years for aggravated assault), while those arrested for rob-
bery is 7.7 years.195  Intervening work history also plays a role in re-
ducing the risk of recidivism.196
The Bushway study found that redemption rates for single offend-
ers converge with the general population after seven to ten years, and
in concluding that “the 40-year period put forward in the El v. SEPTA
(2007) case . . . seems too old of a score to still be in need of settle-
ment,”197 it is an illuminating postscript to SEPTA for two reasons.
First, it undermines the assumption that a criminal offense should al-
ways be considered a negative marker to be overcome.  One-time of-
fenders over forty generally present the same hazard risk after a few
years as the general population.  In some cases, an older offender may
have a lower hazard rate than a younger person with no criminal re-
cord history, suggesting that applicant age is an equally or more im-
portant marker to evaluate risk.  In these cases, for one-time minor or
long-ago convictions in which the individual’s hazard rate is similar to
that of the general population, a criminal record provides little predic-
tive value and likely should be disregarded.
192. Id. at 49–50.
193. Id. at 51.
194. “[F]ive years after an arrest, [people with criminal records] in their mid-twenties are just
over 1 percent more likely to commit a crime than otherwise similar nonoffenders.” PAGER,
supra note 1, at 155 & 211 n.35.  In contrast, recidivism the first year after the arrest is a serious
concern. Id. at 127.
195. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 7, at 12.  Another study found that recidivism rates
are higher for persons convicted of property offenses than violent offenders.  Langan & Levin,
supra note 188, at 1.
196. PAGER, supra note 1, at 127.
197. Bushway et al., supra note 191, at 52.
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Even for relevant convictions, the counterintuitive nature of com-
paring hazard rates shows the importance of contextualizing the sig-
nificance of a negative credential.  Intuition is blind to the risk of
hiring a younger applicant over an older one, even though age may be
as important a factor as conviction history.  Despite the intuitive aver-
sion to hiring persons who have previously committed a violent crime,
a previous offense involving violence has a lower hazard rate than an
offense involving fraud.  More broadly, the findings from these studies
strongly suggest that there is no “one-size-fits-all”198 analysis of a
criminal record: some criminal record histories ought to be disre-
garded because they are distant in time (like the one in SEPTA), and
those that are relevant are only properly evaluated when taken in
context.
Nexus tests have not caught up with the conclusions reached in
these studies.  Post-SEPTA courts have not had the opportunity to
determine whether the studies indicate that a background check or
other negative credential does not, on its own, signify that the appli-
cant is a greater risk to the employer than an applicant without a con-
viction.  Redemption research may persuade courts to require an
individual assessment in order to establish business necessity, as the
EEOC recommends, on the ground that, like the personality test in
Karraker, a criminal record history must take account of the larger
context of the individual in order to serve as a reliable predictor of
future behavior.  But nexus tests that do not take account of postcon-
viction history, particularly age, time elapsed after the record, and evi-
dence of rehabilitation, fail to capture these nuances.  Permitting
employers and the courts to make intuitive, generalized assessments
about the meaning of a conviction history will consistently overesti-
mate its risk based on the stigma of the criminal record history rather
than its predictive value.
While redemption research may seek to provide some rationality to
employers’ background check policies,199 in the process, it has re-
vealed that validation of a background check, in the manner that
background checks are often conducted, is almost impossible to con-
ceive, and has affirmed the EEOC’s recommendation that employers
conduct an individual assessment before rejecting applicants with a
criminal record history.  Employers lack sufficient information to en-
gage in a reasonably accurate risk assessment of applicants based on a
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Kurlychek et al., supra note 190, at 486 (“The article is specifically designed to
help employers and public policy makers determine the relevance of criminal history records for
predicting future behavior, including but not limited to future arrest and conviction.”).
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civil disability alone.  Criminal history reports, which simply list the
disposition and date, do not enable the employer to understand the
relationship between a civil disability and the job sought, postconvic-
tion rehabilitation, or other relevant factors that must be evaluated for
an assessment to be accurate.200  While a matrix could conceivably be
developed that takes account of the age of the applicant and time
elapsed since the conviction to provide recidivism rates for each type
of conviction, such a matrix would be no more than a rule of thumb
and would not eliminate the need for an individual assessment of the
applicant’s propensity to engage in counterproductive workplace be-
havior.201  Even with this information, employers reviewing back-
ground check results may not have the necessary experience or the
time to correctly evaluate them.  As the EEOC has correctly in-
structed, the best practice would be to obtain that information
through an individual assessment, taking account of all relevant fac-
tors.  Employers would be wise to follow the EEOC guidance.  But
with mixed messages from courts on permissible background checks
and whether they endorse the EEOC’s view of them, and from the
states on whether and how to consider the postconviction history of
applicants, employers may instead conflate the stigma of a conviction
with its significance or ignore the legal requirements entirely.
This Part has shown that the current approaches by which federal
and state governments restrict employer use of criminal convictions in
hiring face important limitations in encouraging the reintegration of
people with criminal convictions into the workforce.  There are few
privacy protections that apply to criminal records, and most of those
are easily bypassed by employer criminal conviction inquiries of appli-
cants.  Many Ban the Box laws do not require a suitability determina-
tion before considering criminal records and thereby miss an
opportunity to encourage employers to individually assess candidates
before considering the potential workplace risk of a criminal convic-
tion.  Finally, Title VII and state nexus standards are undermined by
the judiciary’s heightened statistical requirements and deference to
employer justifications in hiring screen challenges.
200. Williams, supra note 22, at 547–48 (stating that employers lack “access to reliable infor-
mation that would allow them to predict recidivism”).
201. Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism:
What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575–78 (1996) (likelihood of recidivism depends on a vari-
ety of personality traits, including antisocial behavior, social achievement, and ability to manage
interpersonal conflict), cited in Williams, supra note 22, at 547 n.177.
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V. A DISABILITY APPROACH TO REGULATE THE USE OF CIVIL
DISABILITIES IN EMPLOYMENT
The previous Part explained the gaps in current privacy, procedural,
and nexus protections for civil disabilities.  This Part makes the case
that criminal records, like other civil disabilities, are most appropri-
ately regulated in the same manner as protections for people with
physical and mental disabilities.  A disability framework would first
eliminate from consideration those negative credentials that offer no
predictive value on privacy grounds, and then tailor nexus and proce-
dural requirements to the stigma and relevancy of the information.  In
the case of relevant criminal record histories, this analysis suggests
that after retiring old and minor convictions with no predictive value,
background checks should be permitted after the candidate has been
found otherwise qualified, and after a full consideration of applicants’
postconviction history.
A. Applying the Disability Framework to
Civil Disability Discrimination
Like applicants with mental and physical disabilities, who must
overcome a stigma that associates disabilities with poor job perform-
ance, people with criminal convictions seeking employment must
overcome a stigma that associates a criminal conviction with negative
workplace behaviors.  A disability framework would address the wide-
spread exclusion of people with criminal records from the workplace:
(1) By restricting employer access to long-ago and minor convic-
tions that do not predict future behavior by sealing or expung-
ing these records, or otherwise prohibiting their disclosure for
employment purposes;
(2) Where criminal records may predict future behavior, by permit-
ting their disclosure to employers after the applicants have been
found qualified for the position and provided a conditional of-
fer of employment; on condition that
(3) Employers only reject these conditional employees based on an
individualized assessment that their criminal record history
presents a genuine risk to the workplace that cannot be reason-
ably accommodated.
In this disability framework, the privacy, nexus, and procedural pro-
tections are mutually supportive.  Nexus protections give effect to the
procedural goal of giving applicants a chance to explain their negative
credential.  Procedural protections provide a process in which nexus
standards are more likely to be met, and make privacy protections
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more meaningful by preventing employers from seeking the prohib-
ited information from applicants.  And privacy protections prevent ir-
relevant, stigmatic information from tainting nexus protections.
This approach is consistent with the regulation of other disabilities
and has applicability to other civil disabilities and areas outside of em-
ployment.  In the case of credit history, which has no demonstrated
relationship to workplace behavior, this approach would sharply limit
the disclosure of credit history for employment purposes on privacy
grounds, while permitting such inquiries in fields (such as lending)
where credit history has predictive value.  These recommendations
have equal applicability to federal, state, and local laws as amend-
ments to existing protections.
B. Privacy Standards To Prevent Disclosure
of Irrelevant Dispositions
Unlike for medical disabilities, there are few objective sources an
employer can turn to in the case of criminal records and other civil
disabilities to evaluate their significance.  As discussed in Part III.D.2,
accurate evaluation of a civil disability can be counterintuitive because
highly prejudicial records can be irrelevant.  Highly stigmatizing, long-
ago convictions, such as the forty-year-old homicide in SEPTA, can
overwhelm an employer’s ability to provide a fair assessment of the
candidate even though the conviction may be irrelevant as a marker of
counterproductive workplace behavior or recidivism.
Given the lack of an objective source for evidence-based assess-
ments about the workplace risk of a criminal conviction, and the like-
lihood that an irrelevant criminal conviction will be misused or
misinterpreted, a disability framework would prohibit the use of old
and minor convictions in hiring screens on privacy grounds.  Federal
and state criminal justice agencies, which are the most objective
sources in determining the meaning of a criminal record, would dis-
pose of criminal records no longer in need of settlement and protect
this irrelevant information from disclosure for employment purposes.
Like genetic screening, applicants have a heightened privacy inter-
est against the use of old or minor criminal conviction records that
have no relevance in predicting negative workplace behaviors, and
which are likely to be misused or misinterpreted in hiring screens.  Re-
demption studies show that most convictions do not indicate a risk of
recidivism significantly higher than that of the general population af-
ter a finite period of time, typically five to ten years.  States should
limit the criminal records available for use in hiring screens after this
redemption period has elapsed.  Restrictions could be relaxed if an
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offender’s criminal record reflects an atypically long redemption pe-
riod, such as repeat offenders, and tightened if the type of conviction
or age group of the offender indicates a shorter period to redemption.
People with criminal records who undergo specific rehabilitative mea-
sures—for example, successful completion of a treatment program af-
ter conviction for a drug-related offense—should be eligible for
administrative relief that would create a presumption of
rehabilitation.
There are a number of models that states could use for this purpose.
Massachusetts provides a model for time-based restrictions on crimi-
nal records for employment and on sealing convictions after those pe-
riods.202  New York’s certificate of relief from disabilities provides a
model for conduct-based rehabilitation before standard rehabilitation
periods have elapsed,203 although easing the process for issuing certifi-
cates is in order, for example, by providing for their automatic evalua-
tion at the completion of the offender’s sentence, instead of requiring
a separate application.
C. Procedural Protections Consistent with the ADA
Second, consistent with the ADA’s regulation of medical inquiries,
and with Ban the Box laws in New Mexico and Hawaii, employers
should be required to provide a conditional offer to applicants before
inquiring about civil disabilities.  Hiring screens that consider the ap-
plicant’s criminal conviction before finding the applicant suitable for
the job runs an unreasonable risk that the employer will find the can-
didate unsuitable because of the conviction.204  As with the ADA, this
approach reconceptualizes the meaning of a criminal record, from be-
ing a negative credential that may automatically disqualify a candi-
date, to a potential marker of risk that should be evaluated after
finding the applicant otherwise qualified.  Limiting access to criminal
record histories to after an applicant is found qualified for a position
also improve the odds of in-person contact with employers, which is
202. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 100A (West 2012) (prohibiting employer inquiries
about single misdemeanor convictions older than five years, and requiring the sealing of convic-
tions on request after five to ten years).
203. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 701–703 (McKinney 2012); see also Love & Frazier, supra note
96, at 3.
204. Cognitive studies have shown that individuals faced with a need to make snap, compli-
cated judgments can result in biases against stigmatized groups. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 95
(2008).  Requiring a bifurcated approach of considering an applicant’s qualifications for the posi-
tion before evaluating whether the applicant’s criminal conviction presents an unreasonable
workplace risk might decrease the likelihood of bias against persons with criminal convictions in
hiring.
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more likely to result in employers giving people with criminal records
a fair assessment.205  Employers who have already found applicants
qualified for a position are in a better position to isolate the risk fac-
tors of, and to contextualize, a civil disability.  By limiting the number
of risk assessments to only those applicants with a conditional offer, it
encourages meaningful, individualized assessments, recognized by the
EEOC as a best practice.
D. Nexus Protections Focused on Postconviction History
Like the ADA, the primary goal of the nexus protection for crimi-
nal convictions is to ensure that risk evaluations are contextualized.
The risk of recidivism by people with criminal records approaches that
of the general population based on a number of postconviction fac-
tors, including the nature of the offense, the age of the applicant, the
time elapsed since the offense, and evidence of rehabilitation.  Nexus
standards that now provide for a general “reasonableness” standard,
such as the Wisconsin statute,206 do not give employers and courts ad-
equate guidance, and should be amended to require consideration of
postconviction history.  Drawing on the EEOC enforcement guidance
and from states such as New York that require consideration of spe-
cific, relevant factors,207 nexus requirements should clarify that em-
ployers must consider postconviction history, including, at a minimum,
the nature and gravity of the crime, the age of the applicant, time
elapsed since the civil disability, and evidence of rehabilitation.
Nexus standards would also require reasonable accommodations to
be made by employers. Requiring accommodation is a logical exten-
sion of nexus protections “to eliminate discrimination in an area
where removing bias in evaluation is impossible.”208  Like other areas
in which reasonable accommodations may address an anomaly in an-
tidiscrimination law,209 an accommodation mandate would resolve the
205. Pager et al., supra note 14, at 200–01 (“[T]esters who interact with employers are be-
tween four and six times more likely to receive a callback or job offer than those who do not;
and personal contact reduces the effect of a criminal record by roughly 15 percent.”).
206. See, e.g., Mullings, supra note 135, at 289 (criticizing a Wisconsin statute’s general stan-
dard, which has resulted in “a test that has made it easier to exclude more people with criminal
records”).
207. See EEOC ARREST AND CONVICTION GUIDANCE, supra note 17; N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 753 (McKinney 2012).
208. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurispru-
dence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1368 (1991).
209. See id. (proposing that Title VII apply a reasonable accommodation principle to accents
to address “the potential anomaly of treating physical speech impediments as more deserving of
protection than accents”); see also Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work–Family Conflict: Developing a
Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 306–08 (2004)
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anomalous distinction between legal protections for medical and civil
disabilities.  A reasonable accommodation in reentry may require an
employer to tolerate a workplace risk somewhat higher than the gen-
eral population, particularly for low-risk jobs with little interaction
with the public.210  For high-risk individuals, government subsidies
and bonding programs have and should provide incentives for em-
ployers to defray the costs of accommodation.211
VI. CRITIQUES OF THE USE OF THE DISABILITY MODEL
FOR CRIMINAL HISTORY
The principle critique of a disability framework is that employers
will respond to the additional compliance costs by engaging in statisti-
cal discrimination against African-Americans because of a perception
that blacks are more likely to engage in criminal conduct.  The second
critique is that restricting access to negative credentials will result in
employers bypassing formal channels entirely and searching for crimi-
nal records on publicly available, electronic databases.  This Part re-
sponds that a disability approach is unlikely to increase statistical
discrimination against African-Americans, as it would permit criminal
record inquiries, and in any event statistical discrimination is unlawful,
intentional race discrimination that should be challenged under Title
VII.  In response to the second critique, while shielding old and minor
convictions from employers requires federal and state coordination, it
is likely to be followed because employers will benefit from reduced
exposure to negligent hiring claims.  Employers and credit reporting
agencies that fail to do so should be addressed through enforcement
of federal and state privacy laws.
(proposing applying reasonable accommodations to parental obligations); Noah D. Zatz, Manag-
ing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discrimina-
tory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1432–33 (2009) (arguing that courts incorporate an
accommodation mandate in Title VII in holding employers liable for failing to address harass-
ment of employees by customers and other third parties).
210. See Paul-Emile, supra note 23, at 944–45 (applying the reasonable accommodation man-
date to the consideration of criminal background records in employment).
211. Strahilevitz, supra note 213, at 379.  The federal government already provides financial
incentives to hire people with criminal records. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 2, at 291 (“[T]he
Work Opportunity Tax Credit provides a federal incentive for employers to hire [people with
criminal records], and the Federal Bonding Program makes no-cost bonds available to protect
employers who hire [people with criminal records.]”).  A similar argument in favor of subsidy
regimes has been made for disabilities. See Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public
Funding for Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the
Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 197–99 (1998).
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A. The “Perverse Consequences” Critique: Disability Protections
Will Result in More Discrimination
Against African-Americans
A corollary to the argument for greater hiring protections for per-
sons with criminal convictions is that such protections should also ad-
dress the persistent joblessness of African-Americans, who
disproportionately have a criminal record.212  But whether this as-
sumption is correct depends on the likely reaction of employers who
initially evaluate black applicants without the benefit of a criminal
background history.  An important critique to a proposal to limit an
employer’s access to criminal record history during the application
process is the possibility that such protections would perversely in-
crease hiring discrimination against African-Americans.
The first “perverse consequence” is if employers react to an absence
of criminal record history information by assuming that all African-
American applicants have a criminal record.  Employers may then dis-
proportionately reject black applicants, including those with a “clean”
criminal record history.  In this event, the resulting “statistical discrim-
ination”213 against blacks without a criminal history from employment
may overwhelm the benefits of such protections.
There is some evidence supporting the “statistical discrimination”
theory.  One study by Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael
Stoll compared the racial composition of hires by employers who
check criminal record history with employers who do not, and found
that “employers who perform criminal background checks are more
likely to hire black applicants than employers that do not.”214  This
finding supports “the proposition that in the absence of a criminal
background check, employers use race to infer past criminal activity,
especially employers with a strong stated aversion to hiring people
with criminal records.”215  According to its authors, “The results of
this study suggest that curtailing access to criminal history records
212. See, e.g., Lyles-Chockley, supra note 2, at 283 (“The [successful] reentry of black [people
with criminal records] presents an opportunity to directly confront racism.”).
213. Economists consider such a form of discrimination to be “statistical discrimination,” or
discrimination against a protected class because of a perceived negative trait because the class is
statistically more likely to possess this trait. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidis-
crimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 365 (2008) (“Statistical discrimination is based, not on irra-
tional animus, but on the use of heuristics by decisionmakers who believe—correctly or not—
that observable hallmarks of membership in a group correlate with some undesirable
characteristic.”).
214. Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Ra-
cial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 473 (2006).
215. Id. at 471.
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may actually harm more people than it helps and aggravate racial dif-
ferences in labor market outcomes.”216
As a first response, it is not clear that a study showing that firms
that conduct background checks hire blacks more frequently than
those that do not is in tension with the disability approach recom-
mended in this Article.  The proposed disability framework would not
prohibit background checks, but rather guide their use by retiring ir-
relevant records and encouraging a contextualized evaluation of the
applicant and her criminal conviction.  Assuming the validity of the
findings reported by the Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll study, it is still an
open question whether the protections recommended in this Article
would impact the racial composition of hired applicants.  To the extent
that the findings in the Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll study are the result
of a rational choice by employers to reject applicants who may pose a
true workplace risk,217 the disability approach of filtering out only ir-
relevant criminal records from consideration may expand opportunity
for African-Americans as a whole.218
More to the point, whether or not the employer behavior docu-
mented by Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll is “rational,” antidiscrimination
law forbids it.  Simply put, in the words of EEOC Commissioner Vic-
toria Lipnic, “where, in fact, in the absence of a criminal background
check an employer chooses to use race as a proxy for criminal history,
that employer is patently violating federal civil rights law.”219  Other
forms of statistical discrimination, such as calculating retiree benefits
based on projected longevity by sex, and hiring men because of the
likelihood that women will take family-related leave, have long been
216. Id. at 473; see also id. 473–75 (“Surely, calls to seal criminal history records fail to take
into account this unintended consequence and the market failure associated with inferior infor-
mation that employers would have as a result.”).
217. Other commentators have cast doubt on the statistical discrimination model as applied to
African-American men.  Devah Pager & Diana Karafin, Bayesian Bigot? Statistical Discrimina-
tion, Stereotypes, and Employer Decision Making, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 70,
70–93 (2009) (stating that employers who report positive feelings about particular African-
American employees “nevertheless maintain strong negative attitudes about black men
generally”).
218. See Paul-Emile, supra note 23, at 949; see also Keith Finlay, Effect of Employer Access to
Criminal History Data on the Labor Market Outcomes of Ex-Offenders and Non-Offenders, in
STUDIES OF LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIATION 89, 122 (David H. Autor ed., 2009) (finding
strong evidence that people with criminal records in states with “open records” policies have
lower wages and earnings than those in states with more closed policies, and weaker evidence
that “non-offenders from highly offensive groups” have improved labor market outcomes).
219. The Impact of Criminal Background Checks and the EEOC’s Conviction Records Policy
on the Employment of Black and Hispanic Workers: Hearing Before the U.S. Comm’n on Civil
Rights (Dec. 7, 2012) (statement of Victoria A. Lipnic, Comm’r, EEOC); see also Fishkin, supra
note 125, at 1465 (“Disparate treatment based on characteristics such as race and sex is prohib-
ited even when it is rational discrimination . . . .”).
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disfavored by the courts.220  This is true even if such statistical discrim-
ination may prevent discrimination against protected classes.221  Even
if permitting prehire exclusion of people with criminal records re-
sulted in a more racially diverse workforce, such a “bottom line” out-
come is not a defense to a disparate impact claim.222
Any alternative approach that permits the categorical exclusion of
people with criminal records to deter statistical discrimination against
African-Americans has no sound basis in law or policy.  To the extent
that this approach is grounded in the absence of criminal record his-
tory as a protected classification under Title VII, ending a socially de-
structive hiring practice need not require a protected class.223
Moreover, over 100 cities, counties, and states confer protected class
status to people with a criminal conviction.224  To the extent that the
differential treatment of people with criminal records is based on size
of the population, there are now seventy million people with criminal
records.225  Clearly, permitting discrimination against people with civil
disabilities is not called for either on the grounds that they are a small
population or that they belong to a class that the public has not con-
sidered in need of protection.
As discussed in Part III.B.2, the argument that discrimination
against people with criminal records ought to be allowed may rest on
the notion that people with criminal records choose to become stigma-
tized by engaging in criminal conduct, and so are not deserving of such
protection.226  But no group should be exposed to needless suffer-
220. Amanda K. Baumle & Mark Fossett, Statistical Discrimination in Employment: Its Prac-
tice, Conceptualization, and Implications for Public Policy, 48 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 1250,
1263–65 (2005).
221. Strahilevitz, supra note 213, at 377 n.56 (citing Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443
S.E.2d 491, 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), and Hillman v. Columbia Cnty., 474 N.W.2d 913, 922–23
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991), as cases in which courts rejected the argument that permitting disclosure of
HIV status would protect gays and blacks from statistical discrimination).
222. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982).
223. Many types of employment discrimination have been prohibited against classes not his-
torically thought of as in need of special protection, e.g., applicants subject to polygraph tests,
Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (2012), the jobless, N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE tit. 8, § 8-107(21) (2014), and those selected for jury duty, Federal Jury System Improve-
ments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2012). See Fishkin, supra note 125, at 1470 (stating that Ban the
Box laws and other efforts to limit “bottlenecks” that exclude people from hiring on a basis
other than a protected classification are justified insofar as they reshape employment opportuni-
ties to “mak[e] a pervasive bottleneck that much less severe”).
224. NELP BAN THE BOX REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
225. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 13 tbl.25.  By way of comparison, when
Congress enacted the ADA, it found that there are about 43 million individuals with physical or
mental disabilities in the U.S.  Kramer, supra note 26, at 1283.
226. See Connor & White, supra note 150, at 1003 (criticizing the EEOC’s prioritization of
criminal record discrimination that has a disparate impact on racial minorities: “ultimately, any-
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ing.227  Punishing people with criminal records beyond the terms of
their sentence supports no legitimate criminal justice goal.228  Public
policy supports the employment of people with criminal records to
promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism.229
To the extent that policies promoting equal opportunities in hiring
for African-Americans and people with criminal convictions are in
tension, hiring protections should seek equal opportunity in a manner
that deters employer bias against both groups.  This Article argues
that the approach of retiring only irrelevant criminal records and al-
lowing posthire, preplacement access to criminal record histories
strikes the right balance of permitting employers access to the “clean”
records of African-American applicants who may otherwise be tainted
with the specter of criminality, while encouraging a fair evaluation of
people with criminal convictions.
Alternatively, one might view the project of moving the employer
inquiry until after a conditional offer with skepticism, because it will
not actually prevent bias against people with criminal records (while
possibly increasing discrimination against African-Americans).  Cer-
tainly, subjectivity in hiring, whether at the initial application or at a
later stage, is likely to result in the rejection of qualified African-
Americans and in the overbroad exclusion of applicants with criminal
records.230  Hiring managers concerned about a criminal conviction,
but without access to information regarding the risk presented by one,
may choose the “safe” route of rejection.  As discussed in Part II.B,
this is particularly the case if the applicants are African-Americans
with criminal records, who suffer near-total exclusion from the
one who decides to commit a crime is likely to experience the stigma associated with that choice
. . . . In those cases, so long at [sic] is that decision, and not race, that causes him disadvantage,
Title VII does not protect him”).  For an argument that would permit widespread access by
employers to criminal history while forbidding access to HIV status, see Strahilevitz, supra note
213, at 377.
227. As Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll seem to agree, cautioning that wholesale employer access
to criminal record repositories “is sure to punish many people with criminal records with rela-
tively minor and distant run-ins with the law.”  Holzer et al., supra note 214, at 475.
228. Bronsteen et al., supra note 3, at 1038.
229. MY BROTHER’S KEEPER TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 10 (2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/053014_mbk_report.pdf.
Our youth and communities suffer when hiring practices unnecessarily disqualify candi-
dates based on past mistakes.  We should implement reforms to promote successful
reentry, including encouraging hiring practices, such as “Ban the Box,” which give ap-
plicants a fair chance and allow[ ] employers the opportunity to judge individual job
candidates on their merits as they reenter the workforce.
Id.
230. See Sarah Esther Lageson et al., Legal Ambiguity in Managerial Assessments of Criminal
Records, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 176 (2015) (finding that employers lacking formal back-
ground check policies are more likely to reject applicants with criminal records).
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workforce.231  But the clearest path to remove discretion from line hir-
ing managers, shielding all criminal records, may work at cross-pur-
poses: protecting African-Americans with criminal records by
expanding privacy rights could result in statistical discrimination
against African-Americans generally.
These critiques, taken together, suggest that in addition to the
broad contours of privacy, procedural, and nexus protections, reentry
policies should encourage targeted measures that limit subjectivity in
hiring.  This could entail placing some responsibility in the hands of a
third party more likely to conduct a valid risk assessment, such as a
parole officer,232 the dissemination by public agencies of bright-line
rules that employers can use to comply with nexus requirements233
and, as others have recommended, affirmative defenses to negligent
hiring claims for employers who have complied with the nexus
requirements.234
B. The Legal Avoidance Critique: Employers Will Respond to
Procedural and Nexus Protections by Evading Them, and
Shielding Civil Disabilities from Disclosure Is Futile
A second critique is that employers will respond to a more regu-
lated regime by adopting legal-avoidance tactics that will ultimately
frustrate its purpose.  Critics of the ADA have noted that it has not
led to the mass integration of people with disabilities into the
workforce, and posit that this is because the costs of compliance are
greater than the costs of avoidance.235  This critique has equal force
here: when employers must undergo the cost of delaying background
checks to after conditional offers, and of individually assessing candi-
dates with criminal records, it is unrealistic to expect that attempts to
cordon off irrelevant, prejudicial data, as contemplated by the privacy
protections recommended in this Article, will be successful.  As James
Jacobs and Tamara Crepet observe, “The information infrastructure is
231. PAGER, supra note 1, at 90–91.
232. Williams, supra note 22, at 552–56.
233. These rules could provide guidance on the relevance of certain types of convictions over
time, and which dispositions are particularly relevant for certain occupations (e.g., convictions
that would on their face permit security firms to reject applicants hiring armed peace officers
because the conviction history precludes a gun permit).
234. See, e.g., Smyth, supra note 22, at 51–52.
235. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employ-
ment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 534–36 (2004) (review-
ing THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE (David C.
Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003)) (stating that the employment of people with
disabilities fell after the enactment of the ADA, leading to “perverse-effects” arguments that the
ADA costs of compliance caused the drop).
1040 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:991
too large, too entrenched, and too useful to too many people to make
its contraction even a remote possibility.”236  To privacy realists, it
may be more fruitful to instead require that employers obtain accu-
rate237 information and use it in a manner consistent with the em-
ployer’s business necessity.
But no one seriously argues that all information about individuals is
or should be available to the public.  Medical reports, personal tax
disclosures, attorney–client communications, and law enforcement in-
vestigations are all shielded from public view and protected in various
ways to prevent their disclosure except under limited circumstances.
These protections extend to the private sector as well: CRAs face sig-
nificant liability for inadvertent disclosure or misreporting of an indi-
vidual’s credit or criminal record histories.238  To the extent that civil
disability hiring screens seek highly stigmatizing information that
serve no legitimate purpose, they should be regulated accordingly.239
Critics may respond that employers restricted from obtaining full
background checks from applicants and CRAs will find other means
to obtain the information.  Some private companies sell information
about civil disabilities online in repositories that are notorious for hav-
ing inaccurate and outdated material.  Arguably, applicants with civil
disabilities are better off with background checks conducted by repu-
table CRAs if evaluated by employers who responsibly evaluate them.
But the easy availability of stigmatizing and often incorrect informa-
tion about individuals that can be used unlawfully by employers is a
separate matter.  Vendors that “traffic[ ] in the reputations of ordinary
people”240 are CRAs under the FCRA and are liable for incorrect or
misreported information.  Employers in this scenario would also vio-
late the FCRA for failure to notify employees about a background
check that resulted in an adverse determination.241  To the extent that
236. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 55, at 211; see also Paul-Emile, supra note 23, at 900.
237. Holzer et al., supra note 214, at 475 (stating that “the thorny implementation problems
associated with 52 nonstandard information systems” raises “the nontrivial likelihood of false-
positive background checks”).
238. See, e.g., Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding a CRA
liable for erroneously reported judgment).
239. This criticism has salience under the ADA, with the availability of low-cost testing in
preplacement examinations that may inform employers of the likelihood that applicants will
develop expensive medical conditions, such as genetic testing, or that carry a heavy stigma, such
as sexually transmitted diseases or psychological disorders. See generally Sharona Hoffman,
Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How To Enhance Privacy and Diminish Dis-
crimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 517, 530–42 (2001).
240. Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1071.
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2012).
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this is a problem, it is a matter of underenforcement of existing law,
not a gap in the law.
Moreover, it is not clear that employers would resist heightened pri-
vacy restrictions or resort to illegal, ad hoc background checks in re-
sponse to them.  Privacy protections address the argument that nexus
protections place employers “between Scylla and Charybdis”242 for vi-
olating antidiscrimination law on the one hand and for negligently hir-
ing people with criminal records on the other.243  Privacy protections
give employers a ready defense in a negligent hiring suit: employers
have no reasonable duty of care to be aware of civil disabilities that
are not disclosed and that are not available to them.  Privacy restric-
tions also relieve employers of negative media attention to their em-
ployees’ irrelevant credit or criminal history, particularly in the case of
serious workplace accidents and violence where even a loose connec-
tion between a prior conviction and a tragedy has emotional
resonance.  Clearly, employers have an interest in protecting them-
selves from legal liability and negative media attention, interests that
are met by limiting the availability of irrelevant, highly prejudicial em-
ployee information that can be used against them.
This critique gains force when joined with a central argument of this
Article, that to the extent that relevant but prejudicial information is
used in hiring, it should be used in context, just as a medical inquiry is
under the ADA.  Instead of too much information, current criminal
conviction hiring screens may rely on too little.  The existence of a
criminal conviction alone cannot accurately predict the risk of an ap-
plicant’s workplace behavior, unless accompanied by a variety of
other information.  This critique suggests that reentry policies should
develop sources of information that would signal a person with a crim-
inal conviction’s “desistance,” such as training programs.244  Also, as
with personality tests, if negative markers have validity in predicting
counterproductive employee behavior, it is in a larger context of the
applicant’s qualifications and propensity for counterproductive work-
place behavior.  These can be assessed in a number of valid ways: by
checking references and requiring performance tests or medical in-
quiries.  Such an inquiry that combines background checks with other
242. Nadich, supra note 19, at 802.
243. Id. at 770 (“On the one hand, the potential for liability based on negligent hiring creates
an incentive to ask about convictions and conduct a background check.  On the other hand,
basing an employment decision on an applicant’s criminal history could lead the employer to
inadvertently violate Title VII.” (footnote omitted)).
244. Shawn D. Bushway & Robert Apel, Signaling Perspective on Employment-Based Reentry
Programming: Training Completion as a Desistance Signal, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 21,
40 (2012).
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potential markers of counterproductive workplace behavior would be
an improvement over the current, typical background check process, if
subject to appropriate nexus, procedural, and privacy protections.
VII. CONCLUSION
Stable, meaningful employment is a key step in the reintegration of
people with criminal records into society.  Jobs provide people with
criminal records with the resources to support themselves, renew their
connections to the community, and afford them the dignity that comes
with productive work.  In disrupting criminal connections that cycles
people with criminal records in and out of prison, employment
reduces recidivism and directs government resources away from incar-
ceration and toward rehabilitation.
This Article argues that treating criminal background histories simi-
lar to medical inquiries may facilitate the wide-scale reintegration of
people with criminal convictions into the workforce.  In particular, the
exclusion of applicants with minor and long-ago convictions from the
workforce is unfair and irrational.  These applicants often pose no
greater risk to the workforce than the general population, their exclu-
sion cannot be justified by business necessity, and it imposes great
costs on society, the government, and people with a conviction history.
Shielding many of these convictions from use in employment applica-
tions promotes the equality goal of reintegrating people with criminal
convictions into the workforce, is rational because these individuals
have no greater workplace risk than the general population, and im-
poses few costs on employers.
However, the proposal may not advance the job prospects of appli-
cants with recent or repeat convictions, who are and may always pre-
sent a greater risk to the employer than the general population.  There
is a great cost in their exclusion from the workforce—their desistance
would have the greatest impact on recidivism—but there is a cost to
their reintegration.  The pressing questions for their reintegration are
how to identify those costs and who should bear them.
Further research is needed to identify the outer limit of this cost
and who should bear it.  While this Article, along with at least one
other, proposes a reasonable accommodation mandate for applicants
with a criminal record history,245 the ADA analogy falters here as the
ADA envisions a central role for physicians in making determinations
245. See Paul-Emile, supra note 23, at 944–48 (proposing that employers considering appli-
cants with criminal record histories bear a “‘reasonable accommodation’ mandate . . . [as] an
essential means of reducing social marginalization and . . . a necessary component of full
citizenship”).
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regarding the extent to which an applicant’s disability impacts her
suitability for a job.  But there is no such neutral party assessing the
risk of individual candidates with criminal records for employment in
particular jobs.246  And insufficient information currently exists to
provide employers with a neutral, empirical basis to determine
whether a criminal background presents a risk.
There is a role for government in filling this gap.  Policy prescrip-
tions “that are supported by rigorous social scientific research, espe-
cially through empirical policy analysis and program evaluation” can
reduce recidivism and reduce state budgets.247  While significant re-
search has been conducted to show that the importance to an em-
ployer of a conviction decreases over time, and differs depending on
the conviction, there is a compelling need for more comprehensive
research in this area.248  A risk-assessment approach to postincarcera-
tion reentry policies would study how and in what circumstances a
criminal background history indicates a risk, whether for employment,
housing, credit, or some other license or benefit.  Privacy rights would
be greatest where applicants with a particular criminal background
carry no greater risk than individuals without a criminal background.
Where a background does suggest a heightened risk for negative be-
havior, valid risk assessments would identify who should bear the cost.
If the risk is reasonable, employers should bear the minor costs of
reintegration, and if high, the government should tailor employment
incentives, such as tax incentives, bonding, and ongoing treatment for
the individual, and to reduce recidivism and the cost of postincarcera-
tion policies. Such studies should be publicly available and broadly
disseminated to criminal justice agencies and private stakeholders that
conduct background checks.  Comprehensive research into the factors
that drive recidivism—along with information about public programs
to encourage employers to hire people with criminal records—would
246. Where an applicant has a parole officer, the parole officer could play the role of a treat-
ing physician by making neutral, objective determinations about a disabled candidate’s suitabil-
ity for a job.  Williams, supra note 22, at 552–56.  Unlike physicians, however, parole officers lack
ready information about whether the applicant is a likely risk to the workplace, and as steady
employment reduces recidivism, requiring parole officers to make risk assessments for potential
jobs is in tension with their traditional role of encouraging measures that decrease the likelihood
that people with criminal records will recidivate. Id. at 550–52.
247. Henry F. Fradella & Connie Ireland, From the Legal Literature, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 627,
629 (2008).  For example, the wide-scale introduction of specialized courts for specific social
problems, such as domestic violence and drugs, that often involve mental health diagnoses and
treatment has saved millions of dollars for states in which they have been opened in reduced
back log of criminal cases and defendants sent to prison each year. Id.
248. Pinard, supra note 2, at 996 (“Additional ‘redemptive studies’ are needed.  As a result, it
is difficult at this point to draw clear and principled lines between those convictions that should
be removed from those that should not, particularly as years pass with ‘time clean.’”).
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assist employers seeking to improve their risk assessments of appli-
cants with criminal record histories.  Furthermore, employers seeking
to limit their exposure in negligent hiring claims could rely on such
research findings to show that their assessments are reasonable and
thus not negligent.
